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Allocating the Burden of Proof To Effectuate the Preservation 
and Federalism Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act 
Martin J. LaLonde 
Winding its way along 95,000 miles of beaches, inlets, estuaries, 
harbors, and ports, the U.S. coastline is one of America's most diverse 
and valuable assets. 1 It contains a rich supply of marine and mineral 
resources as well as abundant natural beauty. These very features, 
however, have led to increasing population along the coast and accel-
erating demands for coastal development, both of which increase pres-
sure on this fragile ecosystem. 2 
Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 
(CZMA)3 to address the problems associated with degradation of 
marine estuaries and coastal areas.4 The Act implements a unique co-
operative management scheme between the federal and coastal state 
governments that accounts for both national and local interests in 
coastal resources5 and seeks to accommodate both preservation and 
development concerns. 6 Congress intended that the effective manage-
ment of the coastal areas and resolution of conflicts between compet-
ing uses would help protect this national asset for future generations. 7 
The CZMA encourages states to implement coastal management 
programs (CMPs) to protect their portions of the coastal zone8 and to 
1. 1 DEPT. OF COM., BIENNIAL REP. TO THE CONGRESS ON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 
1 (1992). 
2. Id. 
3. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451·1464 (1990 & 
Supp. I 1991)). 
4. Congress found: 
The increasing and competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone occa-
sioned by population growth and economic development ..• have resulted in the loss of 
living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and adverse changes to eco-
logical systems, decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline erosion. 
16 U.S.C. § 145l(c) (1990). 
5. 136 CONG. REc. H8101 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Pallone) ("It is clear 
that under the CZMA, the whole idea is to have cooperation between the States and the Federal 
Government."). 
6. Congress declared the policy of the Act was, in part, "to preserve, protect, develop, and 
where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and 
succeeding generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (1990). 
7. 16 u.s.c. § 1452(1) (1990). 
8. The CZMA defines the coastal zone as: 
the coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and the adjacent shorelands 
(including the waters therein and thereunder), strongly influenced by each other and in the 
proximity to the shorelines of the several coastal states, and includes islands, transitional 
and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. The zone extends, in Great Lakes 
waters, to the international boundary between the United States and Canada and, in other 
areas, seaward to the outer limit of the United States territorial sea. The zone extends in-
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require that development projects take into account coastal environ-
mental effects. 9 In return for enacting a CMP meeting CZMA stan-
dards, 10 a state receives federal funding to implement and administer 
its program.11 More importantly, pursuant to section 307(c)(l) of the 
Act, federal agencies' actions must be consistent with federally ap-
proved state CMPs to the "maximum extent practicable."12 
When proposing an activity that could affect the coastal zone, 13 a 
federal agency must provide a written statement to the appropriate 
state agency describing why the activity is consistent with a state's 
CMP .14 The reviewing state agency may object to the federal determi-
nation.15 If the federal agency proceeds with the proposed activity 
despite a state objection, the state may seek mediation with the Secre-
tary of Commerce.16 Alternatively, the state may bring suit in federal 
court without having first exhausted the mediation process.17 
When a party seeks judicial resolution of a consistency dispute, the 
land from the shorelines only to the extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses of 
which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters. Excluded from the coastal 
zone are lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held 
in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents. 
16 u.s.c. § 1453(1) (1990). 
9. The management program is "a comprehensive statement .•. setting forth objectives, 
policies, and standards to guide public and private uses oflands and waters in the coastal zone." 
16 U.S.C. § 1453(12) (1990). In addition to other considerations, the state program must "ade-
quately consider" both the "national interest" and "the. views of Federal Agencies principally 
affected by such programs." 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455-1456 (1990). The state management program is 
subject to approval by the Secretary of Commerce. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1990). 
10. These standards (Program Requirements) are set out in 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b) (1988). 
11. 16 u.s.c. § 1455 (1990). 
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1988); see also infra Part I. Congress has recognized that this re-
quirement represents the "single greatest incentive for State participation in the coastal zone 
management program." S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1768, 1776. 
13. Numerous federal agency activities affect the coastal zone. Disputes over the consistency 
provision, however, have primarily arisen over federal leasing of tracts on the outer continental 
shelf (OCS) for oil or gas development. Such development can lead to increased tanker traffic, 
building of deep sea ports, and the risk of oil spills. See generally Jeffrey A. Zinn, Hightide -
Energy in the Coastal Zone: A Question of Risk. 7 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 123 (1980) (discuss-
ing the risks to the coastal zone associated with energy development). The Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331-1356 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)), grants the Secretary of the Interior the authority to lease 
the outer continental shelf (OCS) for oil and gas exploration and drilling. The OCS is the sub-
merged land subject to U.S. jurisdiction that lies beyond the states' "lands beneath navigable 
waters" as defined in 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1988). A state's "lands beneath navigable waters," 
also called the territorial sea of each state, includes "all lands permanently or periodically cov-
ered by tidal waters ... seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the coast line of 
each such state." 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1988). States own the land beneath the territorial sea, 
43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1990), but the federal government owns the land of the outer continental shelf. 
43 u.s.c. § 1302 (1988). 
14. See infra section I.B. 
15. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
16. 16 u.s.c. § 1456(h) (1988). 
17. 15 C.F.R. § 930.116 (1991). 
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court needs to know which party bears the burden of proof18 on the 
issue of consistency so that it may properly rule on certain motions, 
decide the merits, or instruct the jury. The CZMA provides no ex-
plicit guidance on who bears the burden. In addition, few courts have 
addressed the burden of proof issue in a consistency dispute, and those 
that have faced the question have reached different conclusions. For 
example, the Massachusetts District Court, in Conservation Law Foun-
dation v. Watt, 19 stated: "It is plain from the language of the Act and 
regulations that the burden of establishing compliance with a state 
program is on the federal agency proposing the contemplated action, 
and not on the state."20 Other cases, however, suggest that the state 
bears the burden. For example, in California v. Watt, 21 the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the federal agency makes the final consistency de-
termination, implying that the state bears the burden of proving that 
the determination was incorrect.22 Likewise, in Louisiana v. Lujan, 23 
the Louisiana District Court held that the state had to prove that the 
federal consistency determination was arbitrary or otherwise not in 
accordance with law. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the allocation of the bur-
den of proof "is, of course, rarely without consequence and frequently 
may be dispositive to the outcome of the litigation."24 The burden of 
proof allocation in a CZMA consistency dispute has consequences be-
yond the outcome of a particular case; resolution of the division within 
the courts over the CZMA burden allocation will influence the balance 
between state and federal control of the coastal zone and between pres-
ervation and development interests under the Act.25 An improper al-
location of the burden of proof on the issue of consistency could 
undermine Congress's intent regarding these balances.26 
Primarily due to policy considerations, this Note argues that 
courts should allocate to the federal agency proposing an activity that 
18. The term burden of proof encompasses both the burden of production and burden of 
persuasion. See infra note 75. 
19. 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), ajfd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st 
Cir. 1983). 
20. 560 F. Supp. at 576. 
21. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 
U.S. 312 (1984). 
22. 683 F.2d at 1263-67; see infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
23. 777 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1991). 
24. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976). 
25. See infra section 111.C. 
26. Courts can easily and unobtrusively affect congressional policy through the allocation of 
the burden of proof. As one commentator noted, "burden rules seldom touch 'the major 
prejudices of the age.' They are quiet, bland, unspectacular. As a result, juggling them in favor 
of one interest or another tends to go unheeded - and uncriticized. Policies can be promoted or 
stifled smoothly, quietly, and without controversy.'' James E. Krier, Environmental Litigation 
and the Burden of Proof. in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105, 108 (Malcolm F. Baldwin & 
James K. Page, Jr. eds., 1970). 
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may affect the coastal zone the burden of proving consistency with a 
state CMP. This allocation effectuates Congress's intent to vest states 
with primary control to preserve the coastal zone. Part I provides a 
general background of the Act's consistency requirement for federally 
conducted activities. Part II examines the various factors that courts 
traditionally consider when allocating burdens of proof in litigation. 
Part III evaluates these factors as applied to the consistency issue 
under the CZMA. Part IV concludes that courts should assign the 
initial burden of production to the state contesting a federal agency's 
consistency determination; the ultimate burden of proving that the ac-
tivity is consistent with a state CMP, however, belongs with the fed-
eral agency. 
I. CZMA CONSISTENCY DETERMINATIONS 
This Part explains the CZMA's section 307(c)(l) consistency de-
termination process for federally conducted or supported activities. 27 
Section I.A outlines the federal activities for which the statute requires 
a consistency determination. Section I.B surveys the procedural steps 
required to obtain a consistency determination and the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. 
A. Federal Activities That Require Consistency Determinations 
From the 1980s until the passage of the CZMA amendments in 
1990, the most controversial issue under the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act was how to define the scope of the consistency requirement 
for federally conducted activities. Although the amendments have 
conclusively resolved the issue, an examination of this past contro-
versy serves as important background for understanding the current 
operation of the consistency provision. 
As originally enacted, the CZMA consistency provision stated: 
"Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly af-
fecting the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in a 
manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with 
approved state management programs."28 Initial cases broadly inter-
preted this provision to apply to federal activities that affected the 
27. Different consistency requirements also arise under § 1456(c)(3) when privately con-
ducted coastal activities require a federal license or permit. Private parties conducting federally 
permitted or licensed activities must provide to "the licensing or permitting agency a certification 
that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved program and that such activity will 
be conducted in a manner consistent with the program." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1990). 
Each applicant for a federal license or permit must also submit a copy of the certification to the 
appropriate state agency. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (1990). Because different dispute resolution 
mechanisms exist for federally permitted or licensed activities, this Note deals exclusively with 
consistency requirements for federally conducted activities arising under § 1456(c)(l). 
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l) (1990) (emphasis added). The CZMA regulations define "maxi-
mum extent practicable" as "fully consistent with such programs unless compliance is prohibited 
based upon the requirements of existing law applicable to the Federal agency's operations." 15 
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coastal zone whether within or outside its physical limits.29 
In 1984, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the consistency 
doctrine in Secretary of the Interior v. California. 30 The Court re· 
stricted the consistency requirement to activities within a certain geo· 
graphical area,31 concluding that "[s]ection 307(c)(l)'s 'directly 
affecting' language was aimed at activities conducted or supported by 
federal agencies on federal lands physically situated in the coastal 
zone."32 As a result, the Court excluded from the consistency require· 
ment any federally conducted activities on federal land outside the 
coastal zone, such as in the OCS. 33 In addition, the Court narrowly 
construed the "directly affecting" language of CZMA section 
307(c){l) by finding an insufficient causal connection between the chal-
C.F.R. § 930.32 (1993). See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text for discussion of approval 
of states' coastal management plan. 
29. See Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 574-76 (D. Mass.), ajfd. sub 
nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 
1368-82 (C.D. Cal. 1981), modified, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. Secretary of 
the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
30. 464 U.S. 312 (1984). As in most § 307(c)(l) consistency disputes, this case involved a 
state challenge to the Department of Interior's leasing of OCS tracts for oil and gas exploration 
and development. See supra note 13. 
31. In the early 1980s, the executive branch also restricted the consistency doctrine, and 
threatened the very existence of the CZMA program. The Reagan administration suggested 
eliminating CZMA funding and sought to increase OCS leasing. See OFFICE OF THE PRES!· 
DENT, AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR EcoNOMIC RECOVERY 4-36 to 4-37 
(1981); Proposed 5-Year OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226 (1981) (pro-
posed July 28, 1981); Phoebe A. Eliopoulos, Coastal Zone Management: Program at a Cross-
roads, 13 Envt. Rep. (BNA) Monograph No. 30 (Sept. 17, 1982); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Outer 
Continental Shelf Revenue Sharing: A Proposal To End the Seaweed Rebellion, 5 UCLA J, 
ENVTL. L. & POLY. 1, 18 (1985). Congress initially assented to the administration's overtures 
but reestablished funding for the program in 1983. Id. at 19. On a different front, the White 
House instructed the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) - the Depart-
ment of Commerce agency responsible for overseeing the Act, 15 C.F.R. §§ 923, 930 (1991)-to 
review state CMPs to ensure that the plans accounted for the national interest in energy develop-
ment. Tim Eichenberg & Jack Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal Zone Manage-
ment and ''New Federalism," 14 EcoLOGY L.Q. 9, 12-13 & n.12 (1987). The NOAA rejected a 
number of local coastal plans that were to be incorporated into state CMPs, and it contested the 
implementation of certain approved CMPs on the grounds that they restricted energy develop-
ment. See Eichenberg & Archer, supra, at 12-13 & n.14. Federal agencies further encroached on 
the CZMA through their efforts to limit delegation of extensive consistency control to the states. 
Id. at 12 & n.8.; see [15 Current Developments] Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 416 (July 13, 1984) (House 
Oceanography Subcommittee criticizing the NOAA for ignoring and attempting to obliterate the 
CZMA). 
32. 464 U.S. at 330. 
33. 464 U.S. at 330. In his dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that no sensible distinction can 
be drawn "between activities that take place outside the coastal zone and those that occur within 
the zone; it is the effect of the activities rather than their location that is relevant." 464 U.S. at 
345 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Eichenberg & Archer, supra note 31, at 
17-19; Sarah Armitage, Note, Federal "Consistency" Under the Coastal Zone Management Act-
A Promise Broken by Secretary of the Interior v. California, 15 ENVTL. L. 153, 165-69 (1984); 
Eric Esler, Note, CZMA Consistency Review: The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Administra· 
tive Rulemaking and Legislative History in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 13 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 687, 695-96 (1986). 
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lenged federal activity and the potential effects to the coastal zone. 34 
After extensive hearings in the late 1980s and early 1990s,35 Con-
gress responded to the Supreme Court decision by enacting the 
Coastal Zone Management Act Reauthorization Amendments of 
1990.36 The amendments changed the language relating to consis-
tency requirements of federal agency activities. The amended section 
states that "[e]ach Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal 
zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the 
coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent to the 
maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved 
State management programs."37 This provision mandates that the ef-
fect rather than the location determines whether federal activities re-
quire a consistency determination. The amendment broadens the 
"directly affecting" standard of the prior CZMA and expressly over-
turns Secretary of the Interior v. California. 38 Thus, whenever a fed-
34. 464 U.S. at 331-43. The lease sale, the Court reasoned, made up only one of four steps 
that could lead to oil or gas production in the OCS. 464 U.S. at 337. According to the Court, 
the steps required by the 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 for 
developing offshore oil include: "(l) formulation of a 5-year leasing plan by the Department of 
the Interior; (2) lease sales; (3) exploration by the lessees; (4) development and production." 464 
U.S. at 337. The Court reasoned that only in the final two stages do activities occur that may 
directly affect the coastal zone. 464 U.S. at 338-41. This point drew substantial criticism from 
the dissenting opinion and later from commentators. Justice Stevens's dissent noted that: 
The sale of OCS leases involves the expenditure of millions of dollars. If exploration and 
development of the leased tracts cannot be squared with the requirements of the CZMA, it 
would be in everyone's interest to determine that as early as possible. . . . It is directly 
contrary to the legislative scheme not to make a consistency determination at the earliest 
possible point. 
464 U.S. at 357-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Therefore, according to Stevens, 
the link between the lease sales, which the majority exempted from consistency review, and later 
exploration, which the majority would subject to consistency review, is close enough to justify a 
finding that the lease sales directly affected the coastal zone. See also Steven R. Schell, Living 
with the Legacy of the 1970's: Federal/State Coordination in the Coastal Zone, 14 ENVTL. L. 751, 
756-57 (1984). 
35. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Improvement Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1189 Before the National 
Ocean Policy Study of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1990); Coastal Environmental Monitoring: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Natural Re-
sources, Agriculture Research and Environment of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech-
nology, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Coastal Zone Management Act, Part IL· Hearings on H.R. 
4030 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and Great Lakes of the House Comm. on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Coastal Zone Management: Hearings on 
Coastal Zone Management Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Coastal Zone Management Act 
Reauthorization: Hearings on Discussion of Various Aspects of the Reauthorization of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Great Lakes of the House 
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
36. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 
1388·299 to 1388-319 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. III 1991)). 
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(A) (Supp. III 1991) (emphasis added). 
38. H.R. 4450 amends "the 'federal consistency' provisions to overturn the Supreme Court's 
1984 decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California. This would clarify that all federal agency 
activities, whether in or outside of the coastal zone, are subject to the consistency requirements of 
section 307(c)(l) of the CZMA." 136 CONG. REC. H8068 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990). "The Com-
mittee's principal objective in amending [section 307] is to overturn the decision of the Supreme 
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eral agency proposes or conducts an activity that will affect a state's 
coastal zone, it must follow the procedural requirements for con-
ducting a consistency determination, regardless of where the activity is 
located. 
B. Procedural Requirements and Dispute Resolution 
To ensure that existing or proposed federal activities affecting the 
coastal zone are consistent with a state's CMP, each federal agency 
conducting, supporting, or planning such an activity "shall provide a 
consistency determination to the relevant State agency."39 The deter-
mination provides a "detailed description of the activity, its associated 
facilities, and their coastal zone effects, and comprehensive data and 
information sufficient to support the Federal agency's consistency 
statement."40 If the applicable state agency disagrees with the federal 
agency's consistency determination, the state agency must explain its 
objections and propose alternative measures that would allow the fed-
eral agency to meet the consistency requirement.41 
Consistency disputes arise when the federal government decides to 
proceed with the activity as originally planned despite the state's ob-
jection. Parties may pursue two methods of dispute resolution when a 
disagreement arises. First, the parties may agree to submit voluntarily 
to mediation conducted by the Secretary of Commerce. 42 Alterna-
tively, either party may seek judicial resolution.43 In addition, after 
the final judgment of a court and certification by the Secretary that 
mediation is not likely to resolve the dispute, the President may over-
Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California and to make clear that outer Continental Shelf oil 
and gas lease sales are subject to the requirements of section 307(c)(l)." Id. at H8075 (citation 
omitted). In essence, the amendment validates Justice Stevens's interpretation of the CZMA. 
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(C) (Supp. IV 1992). The consistency determination is provided 
at the earliest practicable time in the planning or reassessment of the activity. A consistency 
determination should be prepared following development of sufficient information to deter-
mine reasonably the consistency of the activity with the State's management program, but 
before the Federal agency reaches a significant point of decisionmaking in its review process. 
15 C.F.R. § 930.34(b) (1993). 
40. 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(a) (1993). The statement must take into full account the "enforcea-
ble, mandatory policies of the management program" and must also consider the recommenda-
tions, rather than mandatory dictates, of the state program. 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(c) (1993). 
41. 15 C.F.R. § 930.42(a) (1993). For instance, as exhibited in Conservation Law Found. v. 
Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), affd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 
1983), Massachusetts had responded to the Department of the Interior's consistency determina-
tion for offshore oil lease sales by noting that the oil and gas exploration, development, and 
production that would flow from the lease sale would be inconsistent with the policy of its CMP 
to minimize impacts on the marine environment and would conflict with maritime-dependent 
uses. The state suggested deleting certain tracts from the lease sale as a method of making the 
activity consistent with the CMP. 560 F. Supp. at 574, 576-78. 
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1988). But see Eichenberg & Archer, supra note 31, at 33 
(indicating that mediation has seldom been used and when used has been unsuccessful). 
43. 15 C.F.R. § 930.116 (1993). Parties need not first exhaust the mediation process before 
seeking judicial review. 15 C.F.R. § 930.116 (1993). 
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ride CZMA consistency requirements when the national interest in the 
activity is sufficiently compelling.44 
A brief example highlights the significance of burden allocation 
when a consistency dispute requires judicial resolution. Suppose the 
Department of the Interior seeks to lease oil and gas exploration rights 
in the OCS off the coast of California. 45 The federal agency provides 
the state's coastal commission with a consistency determination de-
claring, in detail, how the lease sale is consistent with California's 
CMP. The coastal commission disagrees and informs the Department 
of the Interior why the proposed activity is inconsistent and what the 
agency can do to meet the state's consistency requirements. The fed-
eral agency stands by its consistency determination and prepares to go 
ahead with the sale. The state files a claim in federal district court 
seeking a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo between 
the parties pending a full hearing on the controversy's merits. The 
state then seeks injunctive relief on the merits to prohibit the lease sale 
until the federal agency has made its lease sale plans consistent with 
California's CMP. The allocation of the burden of proof on the con-
sistency determination may affect the court's decision concerning both 
the preliminary injunction and relief on the merits. 
Because the state must establish a likelihood of success on the mer-
its to obtain a preliminary injunction,46 the allocation of the burden of 
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1991) (the President may waive compliance for in-
consistent activities if they are "in the paramount interest of the United States"); see also infra 
notes 98-100 and accompanying text. In an analogous provision, the Secretary of Commerce 
may override on national security grounds a state's "veto" of a consistency certification for pri-
vate activities that require a federal license or permit. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 
1991); see also Eichenberg & Archer, supra note 31, at 33-34. 
45. In addition to deciding disputes over OCS leasing, federal courts have resolved consis-
tency disputes over a number of different federal activities that implicate various state programs. 
See, e.g., cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983) (federal sewer grants); 
Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1981) (construction of federal docking 
facilities); New York v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 823 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(sale ofland by federal agency); Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035 (D.P.R.) (relocating 
refugees), vacated sub nom. Marquez-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981). 
46. Traditionally the party seeking a preliminary injunction must in addition establish three 
other criteria: (1) a substantial threat of irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief; (2) 
a balance of hardships favoring the state; and (3) the advancement of some discernible public 
interest by entering injunctive relief. See, e.g., Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994, 
997-98 (11th Cir. 1991); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). The state 
should be able to meet these additional criteria. First, the state may show a substantial threat of 
irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief by indicating the loss of control over its 
coastal zone and by indicating the likely adverse environmental effects from the federal activity. 
See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) ("Environmental 
injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often perma-
nent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable."); califomia v. Mack, 693 F. Supp. 821, 828 
(N.D. cat. 1988) ("The potential loss of control over the regulation of its coastline entails a 
serious risk of irreparable injury .... "). Second, the state may show a balance of hardships 
favoring the state by emphasizing the extent of the likely injury to the coastal zone. See, e.g., 
Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 545 ("If [environmental injury] is sufficiently likely ... the balance 
of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment."). Finally, 
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proof may be critical at this stage. In Louisiana v. Lujan, 47 for exam-
ple, the court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunc-
tion to prohibit an OCS lease sale until the federal agency 
demonstrated consistency with Louisiana's CMP. The court rejected 
the plaintiff's argument that the federal agency had the burden of 
proving consistency, and consequently the plaintiffs could not estab-
lish a likelihood of success on the merits. 48 
In adjudicating the merits, the burden allocation may, in a close 
case, determine who succeeds. Furthermore, the allocation defines the 
parties' respective roles in the litigation; for example, the allocation 
determines who must present evidence to support claims of consis-
tency or inconsistency. The allocation will also determine the order of 
presentation of evidence.49 
In addition to affecting the litigation process, the burden allocation 
may influence each party's settlement position and willingness to com-
promise. The party bearing the burden of proof may be more amena-
ble to reaching an agreement to avoid litigation. The burdened party 
may also modify its behavior to avoid disputes. 
Because of the issue's multifaceted importance, an explanation of 
the proper allocation of the burden of proof mandated under the 
CZMA requires a thorough understanding of factors affecting courts' 
burden allocation decisions. 
II. ALLOCATING BURDENS OF PROOF 
This Part examines how courts allocate burdens of proof and how 
the burden may shift during the course of a trial. Section II.A ana-
lyzes factors that courts typically consider when allocating the burden 
of proof. Occasionally Congress mandates the burden allocation by 
statute.so Usually, however, Congress fails to do so.st When burden 
allocation is not mandated by statute, as with the CZMA, courts must 
themselves decide how to allocate the burdens. Although the ultimate 
test is congressional intent,s2 when no intent appears, courts have 
common law power to allocate the burdens by considering other fac-
tors, including the parties' relative ease of access to pertinent evidence, 
the probability that the situation occurred, which party seeks to 
the state can show the injunction will advance some discernible public interest by emphasizing 
the purposes of the CZMA. See infra section 111.C. 
47. 777 F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (E.D. La. 1991). See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text 
for discussion of this court's holding. 
48. 777 F. Supp. at 488. 
49. For other "desirable goals" of the burden of proof, see Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection 
and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 244-46 
(1988). 
50. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1429 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (1988). 
51. See Martinez, supra note 49, at 254. 
52. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
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change the status quo, and whether a certain allocation will effectuate 
the policy of the underlying law. Section II.B discusses the elements 
of the burden of proof: the burdens of production and persuasion. As 
the section explains, courts may in certain circumstances shift these 
components to different parties. 
A. Factors Considered in Allocating the Burden of Proof 
When a statute creates a cause of action, a court deciding who 
bears the burden of proof will initially determine whether Congress 
has spoken on the issue. 53 Because Congress possesses plenary author-
ity over evidentiary rules in the federal court, its intent is binding. 54 
Thus, a court will examine the explicit language of the statute55 and 
the legislative history to learn where the burden of proof should lie.56 
If the legislature's intent is unclear, regulations promulgated by the 
administering executive agency may indicate that the burden of proof 
lies with a particular party.57 For example, regulations implementing 
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which regu-
lates dredge and fill activities in wetlands, 58 place the burden on the 
party proposing the activity to show "that the benefits of the proposed 
53. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1981) ("Where Congress has spoken, we have 
deferred to 'the traditional powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evidence and standards of 
proof in the federal courts' absent countervailing constitutional constraints." (quoting Vance v. 
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980))). 
54. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1975) ("Congress, of course, has 
plenary authority over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal courts."). 
55. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (1993) (relying on the statutory 
language to allocate the burden of proof under the Voting Rights Act in an apportionment case); 
Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 652-53 (1980) (interpreting 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to allocate the burden of proving risk of expo-
sure to benzene); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747-
48 (8th Cir. 1986) (evaluating the language and the statutory scheme of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act to hold that potentially responsible 
parties bear the burden of proving the inconsistency of the government's response costs), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); cf. 14 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§ 2486 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); 
Tim Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 8-9 
(1959); Martinez, supra note 49, at 254. 
56. See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 145-48 (1986) (reviewing language and legisla-
tive history of the Social Security Amendments Act to uphold Secretary of Health's allocation of 
burden of showing medical impairment); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 776 F.2d 276, 
279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reviewing the Civil Service Reform Act and its legislative history to 
uphold the allocation of the burden of proof to a party seeking disability benefits); Zurn Indus. v. 
NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 689-93 (9th Cir. 1982) (examining the legislative history of the National 
Labor Relations Act to uphold the allocation of the burden of proof to the employer to show 
legitimate cause for discharge of the employee); Environmental Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 
998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (relying in part on the legislative history of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to place on the applicant the burden of establishing the product 
safety required for compliance with the Act's labeling requirements). 
57. See, e.g., Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Program, 484 
U.S. 135, 139 n.5, 158-60 (1987) (upholding Secretary of Labor's allocation of burden of proof 
under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969). 
58. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). 
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alteration outweigh the damage to the wetlands resource. "59 
If the statute, regulations, and legislative history do not allocate 
the burden of proof, courts will turn to other factors to assign the 
burden. 60 First, a court may appraise the "convenience" of placing 
the burden on a particular party. Thus, the court may require the 
party who possesses superior "access to knowledge" of the contended 
fact to bear the burden;61 a debtor must prove, for example, payment 
or discharge in bankruptcy.62 Similarly, if a person alleges that a state 
official deprived him of a constitutional right, the official will have to 
plead and prove good faith conduct in her actions because the official 
has peculiar knowledge of her conduct that is the basis of the plain-
tiff's claim. 63 
Additionally, courts often estimate the probabilities of the occur-
rence of a situation or event in order to allocate the burden. 64 The 
court will normally assign the burden to the party whose case depends 
on the occurrence of the more unusual event. 65 For example, because 
59. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4) (1992). In addition, the applicant seeking a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit "always bears the burden of persuading the 
Agency that a permit authorizing pollutants to be discharged should be issued and not denied. 
This burden does not shift." 40 C.F.R. § 124.85(a)(l) (1992); see also Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 
F.2d 595, 629 n.49 (10th Cir. 1990) (reading the NPDES permit regulations to say "it is the 
proponent of a permit who bears the burden of showing that a discharge will comply with all 
applicable standards, not the opponent of a permit who must show that a discharge will violate 
applicable requirements"). 
60. Commentators have discounted three tests traditionally utilized by courts because they 
provide little guidance in the allocation decision. First, the court may allocate the burden of 
proof to the party who must establish the affirmative proposition on the issue. However, a party 
may cast any issue as either a negative or affirmative proposition. For example, in a negligence 
case the defendant might argue that she acted with care while the plaintiff contends that the 
defendant acted negligently. Second, courts often place the burden on the party to whose case 
the issue is essential. But to whom is the fact most essential? In any given case the positive or 
negative of the fact may be equally important to each party. Finally, the burden of proof is often 
allocated to the party with the burden of pleading the issue. The same problems in determining 
the allocation of the burden of persuasion may arise with respect to the burden of pleading. The 
court simply examines the factors determining the allocation at an earlier point in the proceed-
ings. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY c. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.8 (3d ed. 
1985); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 337 (Edward w. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); 14 WJGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 55, § 2486. 
61. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 60, § 7.8; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, 
§ 377; 14 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 55, § 2486; see also Selma Rome & Dalton R.R. 
v. United States, 139 U.S. 560, 568 (1891) (burden ofproofon party possessing relevant account 
books); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 776 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (burden of 
proof on party with disability to prove inability to work); Fleming v. Harrison, 162 F.2d 789, 792 
(8th Cir. 1947) (burden of proof on party with knowledge rather than on plaintifi). 
62. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, § 337. 
63. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980). 
64. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, § 337. 
65. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 60, § 7.8; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, 
§ 337; Cleary, supra note 55, at 12-13 (the court makes an "estimate of the probabilities of the 
situation, with the burden being put on the party who will be benefitted by a departure from the 
supposed norm"); see also Caulfield v. AC & D Marine, Inc., 633 F.2d 1129, 1135 & n.2 (5th Cir. 
Unit A Jan. 1981) (allocating the burden of proof to the party contending that the event occurred 
because it was not logical - that is, not probable - that the asserted event took place); Fire-
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the gratuitous performance of services in a business setting is unlikely, 
the party asserting the existence of free services should bear the bur-
den of proof to rebut a contract claim. 66 To determine a situation's 
probabilities the court could examine how often the situation occurs as 
a part of everyday life. Under a more exacting approach the court 
would consider past judicial experience with particular contentions by 
determining how often parties making an unusual claim have suc-
ceeded in proving the contention in court. 67 
A court may also consider which party desires a change in the 
status quo. Because the plaintiff brings a case to change the present 
state of affairs, that party generally bears the burden of proof. 68 For 
example, the tort plaintiff who seeks to enjoin the defendant from con-
tinuing to behave in a way that causes the plaintiff injury should bear 
the risk of failing to persuade the judge or jury because she desires to 
change the status quo. 69 This reasoning, however, presupposes a pref-
erence for the status quo over change. In some situations, particularly 
in suits to enjoin a disfavored activity, public policy considerations 
may embrace change rather than the current state of affairs.70 To de-
termine whether public policy embraces change, courts should turn to 
the final factor: examining the policy of the underlying substantive 
law. 
Courts often do not hesitate to allocate the burden to realize the 
purposes of the substantive law and to promote public policy goals.71 
man's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1328 (E.D. Mich. 1988) {placing 
burden on insurance policyholders who contend that they come within the "sudden and acciden-
tal" exception to a pollution exclusion clause because they are arguing that the more unusual 
event occurred); In re Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc., 130 B.R. 119, 121-22 (Bankr. D.R.I. 
1991); cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988) (relying, in part, on "common 
sense and probability" to uphold presumption of investor reliance on public material misrepre-
sentations based on fraud-on-the-market theory); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) (utilizing evaluations of probabilities in creating rebuttable 
presumption of discriminatory pattern and practice). But see V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: 
Probability Theory and Standards of Proof. 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 817-18 (1961) (arguing that 
courts should not use probabilities to allocate the burden of proof because this would set the 
probabilities against the party twice - the party alleging the least probable event would have to 
bear the more onerous burden). 
66. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, § 337; cf. Cleary, supra note 55, at 13. 
67. See Cleary, supra note 55, at 12-13 ("The litigated cases would seem to furnish the more 
appropriate basis for estimating probabilities."); Martinez, supra note 49, at 252-53. 
68. See Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 1991); Education Assistance 
Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1987); Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England 
Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1124, 1133 (1st Cir. 1984); McCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, § 337. But see Oddi v. Ayco Corp., 947 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1991) 
{placing burden on defendant who sought to prove a tax rate different from the status quo). 
69. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, § 337. 
70. See GENER. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 
346 (1989). Shreve and Raven-Hansen argue that the change of the status quo is not a proper 
consideration for allocating the burden of proof because "[i]t is often the defendant who dis-
turbed the status quo outside court." Id. This argument apparently presumes that the "status 
quo" test always leads to the plaintiff bearing the burden of proof. 
71. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 267 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
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Accordingly, when the legislative intent disapproves of certain claims 
or defenses, 72 courts should allocate the burden to the party advancing 
the disfavored claim or defense in order to uphold the approved policy 
of the law. For example, to uphold the Bankruptcy Act's congres-
sional policy of giving the debtor a fresh start, creditors must bear the 
burden of proving the disfavored claim that a debt is excepted from 
discharge under bankruptcy.73 
As the Supreme Court has stated, ultimately "[t]here are no hard-
and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in 
every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely a question of policy and 
fairness based on experience in the different situations.' "74 Thus, the 
factors listed above offer significant discretion to courts to make the 
allocation, but courts will likely pay particular attention to the policy 
and fairness issues implicated by the allocation. 
B. Burdens of Production and Persuasion 
Courts and commentators typically bifurcate the burden of proof 
into the burden of going forward with evidence, or production, and the 
burden of persuasion. 75 Ordinarily, the burdens of production and 
persuasion attach to the party that has the burden of pleading a cer-
tain claim or defense. 76 Occasionally, however, the court may shift 
either one or both of the burdens. The plaintiff may have the burden 
of producing evidence regarding the claim, but, once the plaintiff has 
met an initial burden - for example, establishing a prima facie case77 
- the ultimate burden of persuasion may rest with the defendant. For 
In re Atta, No. 87-0551-M, 1988 WL 66866, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988) ("Allocations of 
burdens of production, burdens of proof and standards of proof in American jurisprudence have 
consistently been used to achieve policy goals with a view toward elementary fairness and fur-
thering the purpose of the underlying substantive law.") (quoting In re Mackin, unpublished 
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, § 337; Ronald J. Allen, 
Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions -An Anatomy of Unnec· 
essary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 892, 898 (1982). 
72. The disfavored claim or defense could presumably be one that is upholding a status quo 
that the legislature wishes to change. Put differently, Congress, in enacting certain legislation, 
could be seen as putting its imprimatur on a new vision of the status quo. Those parties opposing 
this new status quo should bear the burden of proof. 
73. See, e.g., In re Rahm, 641 F.2d 755, 756 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 860 (1981); In re 
Furimsky, 40 B.R. 350, 354 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984). 
74. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (quoting 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis added)); see also Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. 
Supp. 1484 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (emphasizing the policy of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act in allocating the burden of proof). 
75. See, e.g., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 60, § 336. 
76. Both the substantive law and rules of procedure often set out the burden of pleading an 
issue. Id. § 337. 
77. A prima facie case in this sense means that the plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient 
to go to the jury. In other words, the party is no longer liable to a nonsuit or to a directed verdict 
for the party's opponent. 14 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 55, § 2491. In contrast, 
Black's Law Dictionary defines a prima facie case as one in which the submission of evidence by 
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example, in cases determining whether the National Environmental 
Protection Act requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), 
courts have adopted a burden-shifting rule. The party challenging an 
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS must first demonstrate that 
the proposed project would have a substantial environmental impact. 
The burden then shifts to the federal agency, which must prove that its 
decision not to prepare an EIS was reasonable. 78 
Courts have employed burden-shifting rules for different reasons. 
For example, in Welsh v. United States, 79 a federal circuit court em-
ployed such a rule because the defendant had easier access to evidence 
than the plaintiff. In James v. River Parishes Co., 80 the court allocated 
the burden of disproving negligence to the defendant due to 
probability considerations. In other cases, courts have shifted burdens 
because of policy concems.81 
In evaluating the allocation of the burden of proof under the con-
sistency provision of the CZMA, a court should consider the different 
considerations discussed in section II.A. Moreover, as section II.B 
reveals, a court may allocate an initial burden to one party and subse-
quently shift the burden of persuasion to the other to achieve a proper 
balance among the different considerations. 
III. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE CZMA CONSISTENCY 
PROVISION 
Courts that have allocated the burden of proof under the CZMA 
consistency provision have done so in a cursory manner and relied on 
one party leads to a certain decision unless the other party rebuts the evidence. BLACK'S LA w 
DICTIONARY 1071 (5th ed. 1983). 
78. In Missouri Coalition for the Envt. v. Corps of Engrs., 866 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989), the court stated: 
The initial burden of proof is upon the challenging party to demonstrate that there were 
facts omitted from the administrative record which, if true, would show that the permitted 
project could have a substantial impact on the environment. If such facts are established, 
and they are of sufficient significance to warrant shifting the burden of proof, the agency 
must then demonstrate that its negative determination was reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
866 F.2d at 1032 (citations omitted); see also Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. 
Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 742 n.24 (3d Cir. 1982); Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 
271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); Pokorny v. Costle, 464 F. Supp. 1273, 1275-76 
(D. Neb. 1979). 
79. 844 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1988). 
80. 686 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1982). The case involved an action brought for damages caused 
by a drifting vessel. The court found that when a drifting vessel causes damage, an inference of 
negligence arises that places on the custodian of the vessel the burden of disproving the inference. 
686 F.2d at 1132-33. 
81. See, e.g., York v. Benefits Review Bd., 819 F.2d 135, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1987) (reasoning 
that, because the federal black lung program was enacted to expand disability coverage for those 
disabled by black lung disease, after plaintiff establishes his injury the defendant carries the bur-
den of persuading the court that other factors caused the disease). 
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different factors. For example, in Louisiana v. Lujan, 82 the court in-
terpreted the CZMA implementing regulations to allocate the burden 
of proof to the state. In Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 83 the 
court relied on an interpretation of the CZMA's policy to allocate the 
burden of proof to the federal agency. No court has explictly consid-
ered more than a single factor in allocating the burden. 
This Part applies each of the factors traditionally utilized by courts 
in allocating the burden of proof in other contexts84 to the question of 
consistency raised under section 307(c)(l) of the CZMA. Section 
III.A evaluates the guidance on the allocation issue arising from the 
language, the implementing regulations, and the legislative history of 
the CZMA and the 1990 amendments. This section concludes that 
these sources suggest, but do not mandate, that the burden should lie 
with the state. Finding no clear congressional intent regarding the al-
location of the burden of proof, however, this Part next considers the 
other factors courts utilize in allocating burdens. Section III.B exam-
ines two traditional factors for allocating the burden - access to evi-
dence and probabilities - and finds them unhelpful in this instance. 
Section III.C evaluates the policy behind the statute, including how 
changing perspectives of the status quo of coastal development af-
fected that policy, and concludes that the federal agency should bear 
the burden of persuasion regarding a federal activity's consistency. 
A. Language, Regulations, and Legislative History 
When a court turns to the CZMA's language, regulations, and leg-
islative history, it will find meager guidance for resolving the alloca-
tion issue. Nevertheless, these sources indicate that Congress may 
have sought to limit the coastal states' ability under the CZMA to 
prevent a federal activity from proceeding. This indication, in turn, 
may affect the decision of who should bear the burden of proof. 
Section III.A.1 examines the single explicit statement regarding 
the allocation of the burden of proof that occurs in the language, regu-
lations, or legislative history of the CZMA. The statement, made by a 
single congressman during floor debates, does not provide significant 
guidance to the decision but does reflect a concern that may indirectly 
affect the allocation issue. The statement suggests that the state 
should bear the burden of proof to avoid giving states a practical veto 
power over federal decisions to conduct certain activities. 85 
82. 777 F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (E.D. La. 1991). 
83. 560 F. Supp. 561, 576 (D. Mass.), affd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 
(1st Cir. 1983). 
84. See supra section II.A. 
85. Members of Congress, judges, and commentators refer to limits to state control in terms 
of avoiding a "state veto" of federal activities .. In this context, a state veto is not an official veto 
power granted by the CZMA, but a state's practical ability to block a federal activity through the 
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Section III.A.2 examines the veto concern raised by the legislator's 
statement introduced in section III.A. I. The objective of avoiding the 
grant of a state veto power indicates that Congress did not intend the 
CZMA to allow a state to halt a federal activity unilaterally by declar-
ing the activity inconsistent with the state CMP. This section exam-
ines the ways the CZMA avoids granting a state veto power and 
concludes that mechanisms other than placing the burden of proof on 
the state - such as placing the final authority to make a consistency 
determination with the federal agency - adequately address the con-
cern over state veto power. 
Section III.A.3 examines the ramifications on the burden of proof 
allocation decision arising when the federal agency has the final au-
thority to make the consistency determination. Normally, an agency 
making a determination under the delegated authority of the law -
such as a finding of fact - need not persuade the court that its deter-
mination is correct. Thus, courts may justifiably defer to some extent 
to the federal agency's final CZMA consistency determination and 
may, as a result, place the burden of proof on the state contesting it. 
Nevertheless, as this section concludes, certain unique features of the 
CZMA suggest that courts do not owe the "final" federal decision def-
erence and in fact may owe state coastal agencies deference. Thus, 
courts should not allocate the burden of proof to the state on this 
ground. 
1. Explicit Statements in the Language, Regulations, and 
Legislative History 
The language and implementing regulations provide no explicit al-
location of the burden of proof. Moreover, only one statement in the 
CZMA's legislative history mentions the burden of proof; during the 
House floor debates on the 1990 amendments, Representative Leon 
Panetta stated that: 
First, this bill will not give States a veto power over Federal agency ac-
tivities. Even if a State disagreed with a Federal agency activity, the 
activity would go forward unless the parties agreed to submit to media-
tion by the Secretary of Commerce or unless the State succeeded in per-
suading a court to overturn the Federal agency's action. 86 
Although revealing his view that the state bears the burden of 
proof, Panetta's statement is hardly dispositive, and only slightly per-
suasive, regarding congressional intent on this issue. As a general rule 
of statutory construction, the statements of a single legislator should 
exercise of its role under the Act. Because one may argue that the state should bear the burden 
of proof to avoid a state veto, this section addresses the state-veto issue. 
86. 136 CONG. REC. H8081 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Panetta) (emphasis 
added). 
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not control the courf s interpretation of legislative intent. 87 In addi-
tion, Panetta's statement only indirectly relates to the allocation of the 
burden of proof; his statement is primarily concerned with pointing 
out that the CZMA stops short of granting coastal states an absolute 
veto power over federal activities. Other statements regarding con-
gressional intent, discussed in the next section, show that allocation of 
the burden of proof to states is unnecessary to avoid state veto power. 
2. Avoiding State Veto Power Over Federal Activities 
Most observers conclude that section 307(c)(l) does not provide 
the states with a veto power over federal activities. 88 When addressing 
the state veto power concern, legislators and courts speak of the state's 
practical power to halt a federal activity unilaterally by declaring it 
inconsistent with the state CMP.89 The "veto concern" thus serves as 
shorthand for discussing the limits of state control and influence 
granted in the CZMA over federal activities.90 
Legislators and courts have discussed four ways in which the 
CZMA may avoid granting a practical veto power to the states. Each 
method recognizes a different degree of control that the states may 
exercise under the CZMA. These methods include allocating to the 
state the burden of persuading a court that the activity is inconsistent; 
giving the final authority to make the consistency determination, prior 
to litigation, to the federal agency; limiting the circumstances in which 
the federal agency must comply with the state CMP; or providing the 
87. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (holding that statements of 
individual legislators do not control statutory interpretation, although they provide evidence of 
congressional intent); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) ("The remarks of a 
single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history."). 
88. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H8080 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Panetta) 
(§ 307(c)(I) "does not give the State a veto power"); 136 CONG. REC. H8101 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 
1990) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (It has been "asserted that the original amendment creates a 
veto authority. It does not."); 136 CONG. REC. E543 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Jones) (§ 307(c)(l) "will not result in the veto of vital national projects or activities"); see also 
California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1982) (examining the structure of the 
CZMA and the CZMA's interaction with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, another stat-
ute involving federal activities on the OCS, to conclude that § 307(c)(l) does not grant a state 
veto power over federal activities on the OCS), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Secretary of the 
Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 
576 (D. Mass.) ("Congress [did not] intend[] to give the states an absolute 'veto power' over 
federal action in the coastal zone."), ajfd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (!st Cir. 
1983); California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359, 1375 (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("No absolute veto power 
has been bestowed upon plaintiffs by § 307(c)(l)."), modified, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), 
revd. sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
89. See California v. Watt, 683 F.2d at 1264. 
90. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found., 560 F. Supp. 561. The court stated: 
Though I reject the notion that Congress intended to give the states an absolute "veto 
power" over federal action in the coastal zone, I believe it is manifest from the fact of the 
statute that Congress did intend to cede some authority in matters of coastal development to 
the affected states in order to achieve cooperative and coordinated development of scarce 
natural resources. 
560 F. Supp. at 576. 
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executive branch an override ability to reverse judgments that favor 
states to the detriment of the national interest. 
Representative Panetta is the only individual who has pointed to 
the assignment of the burden of proof to the states as necessary to 
avoid a state veto. In Conservation Law Foundation v. Watt, 91 the 
Massachusetts District Court reached a contrary conclusion. The 
court did not find that placing the burden of proving consistency on 
the federal agency would give the states a veto power. 92 
The Ninth Circuit, in California v. Watt, 93 discussed the second 
way the CZMA avoids a state veto. The court determined that veto-
power concerns mandated that the federal agency have the final au-
thority to make a consistency determination.94 In other words, a state 
disagreement with a federal consistency determination does not halt 
the federal activity because the federal activity may proceed over a 
state objection unless the state seeks mediation or sues to prevent the 
activity from progressing. By comparison, if the state did possess the 
ability to halt the federal activity by objecting to the consistency deter-
mination, the federal agency would have to seek administrative or ju-
dicial permission to proceed with the activity, a result that has not 
occurred in practice.95 The veto concern thus implicates the question 
of who has to pursue mediation or judicial review, rather than who 
bears the burden of proof once the party has proceeded to court. 
Representative Walter B. Jones, a cosponsor of the 1990 amend-
ments to the CZMA, raised the final two ways in which a state veto 
may be avoided. He stated that section 307(c)(l): 
will not result in the veto of vital national projects or activities. This is 
true for two reasons. First, agency activities under section 307(c)(l) 
must be consistent "to the maximum extent practicable." Under existing 
Department of Commerce regulations this means that an agency must be 
fully consistent where that [a]gency has discretion; however, where the 
[a]gency is acting subject to a nondiscretionary statutory duty, full con-
91. 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), ajfd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watts, 716 F.2d 946 (1st 
Cir. 1983). 
92. 560 F. Supp. at 576. The role of the judge also mitigates the risk that placing the burden 
of proof on the federal agency might give the state a veto power. The state cannot be said to have 
the power to halt the federal activity unilaterally when a single federal judge can ensure that the 
project proceeds. 
93. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Secretary of the Interior 
v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
94. After noting that "[t]he Act is not explicit with respect to the location of final authority 
to determine whether the required consistency exists," the court proceeded to hold that the fed-
eral agency must possess final authority; otherwise the interests of the nation would play second 
fiddle to state interests. 683 F.2d at 1264. The Supreme Court declined to decide this issue upon 
appeal, noting that "[i]n view of our conclusion that a lease sale is not subject to § 307(c)(l)'s 
consistency review requirements, we need not decide who holds final authority to determine 
when sufficient consistency has been achieved." Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 
312, 320 n.5 (1984). 
95. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
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sistency is not required. Second, the bill provides for the President to 
exempt activities which he finds are in the paramount interest of the 
United States .... It will not be frequently used, but this exemption is an 
additional safety valve.96 
Thus, Jones suggests two reasons why section 307(c)(l) does not allow 
a state veto, neither of which involves allocation of the burden of proof 
to the state. First, when other legal obligations are placed on the fed-
eral agency's operations, the state cannot insist on full consistency 
with the state CMP.97 In this manner, the state's control, and thus de 
facto veto power, is limited. Second, section 307(c)(l)(B), added in 
the 1990 amendments to the CZMA, undermines state veto power.98 
This section provides a federal override for federally conducted activi-
ties. Upon written request from the Secretary of Commerce, the Presi-
dent may exempt inconsistent federal activities from compliance with 
the CMP if the activity is of paramount interest to the United States.99 
This provision prevents a state veto100 because the state cannot unilat-
erally stop the federal activity through section 307(c)(l). 
The different methods that allay the threat of a state veto leave the 
state with different levels of control over the federal agencies and over 
the state's coastal zone. At one end, allowing the agency to proceed 
with an activity over a state objection, unless the state seeks mediation 
or proves to a court that the activity is inconsistent, envisions limited 
state influence. At the other end, allowing the agency to proceed after 
a state objection only if the President overrides a judicial decision in 
the state's favor envisions substantial state infiuence. 101 To determine 
the appropriate level of control, and thus an appropriate method to 
avoid a state veto, 'One must have a better understanding of how much 
state control Congress intended the CZMA to give to the states. 
As explained in section III.C.2, the CZMA's overarching policy is 
to give coastal states primary control of the coastal zone. Thus, the 
last two methods should reflect the appropriate level of state control 
and should provide ample protection from states that would exert un-
checked authority over federal activities. Allocating the burden of 
proof to the state or granting to the federal agency the final authority 
96. 136 CONG. REc. E543 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones). 
97. To be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with a state's CMP, the activity must 
be "fully consistent with such programs unless compliance is prohibited based upon the require-
ments of existing Jaw applicable to the Federal agency's operations." 15 C.F.R. § 930.32 (1991). 
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(B) (Supp. 1991). 
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(l)(B) (Supp. 1991). 
100. 136 CONG. REc. H8101 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Tauzin); see also 
136 CONG. REC. H8081 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Panetta) ("[T]he bill con-
tains a new national security exemption which allows the President to override a State's 
objection."). 
101. The CZMA would grant the states the most control, and a clear veto, if the federal 
agency had to go to court and carry the burden of proof to overturn a state objection to a federal 
consistency determination in order to proceed with the activity. 
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to make a consistency determination is unnecessary to avoid a state 
veto power. Nevertheless, because parties to consistency disputes have 
conceded, 102 and courts have agreed, 103 that federal agencies make the 
final prelitigation consistency determination, it is necessary to consider 
how the federal agency's final consistency authority affects the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. 
3. The Final Prelitigation Determination of Consistency 
Placing the burden of proof on the agency to justify its decision 
would seem to contradict the mandate of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (AP A). 104 When the state challenges a federal agency's con-
sistency determination in a federal court, the court will likely consider 
what level of deference to give the agency decision. Because the 
CZMA provides no standard for judicial review, the AP A governs 
agency actions under the CZMA. Pursuant to the AP A, a court will 
generally defer to an agency decision clearly within the agency's statu-
tory authority, particularly on a factual issue. 10 5 
The court for the District of Louisiana so held. In Louisiana v. 
Lujan, 106 the state sought a preliminary injunction against the Depart-
ment of the Interior's plans to lease offshore oil and gas exploration 
and development rights. The state disagreed with the Department of 
the Interior's consistency determination and contended that this activ-
ity was inconsistent with the state CMP. The court determined that 
the plaintiffs could not show a likelihood of success on the merits be-
cause they could not prove that the federal agency's consistency deter-
mination was arbitrary or otherwise not in accordance with law. 107 
The court confined its review to determining whether the agency had 
provided sufficient information to support its determination and thus 
rejected the state's contention that the federal agency should bear the 
102. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent County of Humboldt et. al. at 19, Secretary of the Interior 
v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (No. 82-1326); Brief of Respondents Natural Resources De-
fense Council et. al. at 18, Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (No. 82-
1326). 
103. See California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1263-65 (9th Cir. 1982) (analyzing whether fed-
eral agency or state has final authority to make consistency determination), revd. on other 
grounds sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); Louisiana v. Lujan, 
777 F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (E.D. La. 1991); Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 
576 (D. Mass.) (finding that agency properly fulfilled CZMA procedural requirements by filing 
consistency determination), affd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
104. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988)). 
105. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988) (judicial review); see Conservation Law Found., 560 F. 
Supp. at 567; cf National Wildlife Fedn. v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 391 (D. Wyo. 
1987). A court may not set aside an agency action unless the action is "arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... [or] without observance of 
procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (1988); see also Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401U.S.402, 413-17 (1971) (discussing judicial review of agency action). 
106. 777 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1991). 
107. 777 F. Supp. at 488-89. 
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burden of proving consistency.1os 
Because the CZMA presents a unique situation calling for aban-
donment of standard deference to a federal agency consistency deter-
mination, this Note contends that the decision in Louisiana v. Lujan 
was poorly reasoned. The judiciary traditionally defers to an agency 
decision because Congress delegated authority to an agency to imple-
ment and enforce a particular statute and the agency has expertise in 
the particular field. 109 Under the CZMA, however, Congress did not 
grant any new authority to federal agencies. Instead, Congress man-
dated that federal agencies must act in a manner consistent with state 
CMPs. 110 Thus, the CZMA arguably restricts agency authority, 
rather than granting new authority. Moreover, Congress has indi-
cated that the state agency overseeing the state CMP, not the federal 
agency, possesses the expertise in local coastal management. 111 Fi-
nally, because different federal agencies will need to conduct consis-
tency determinations, courts may achieve uniform interpretation and 
application of a state's CMP only by deferring to the single state view 
regarding its coastal program. Because the traditional reasons justify-
ing deference to federal agencies do not obtain, no deference should be 
given to the federal agency under the CZMA.1 12 Indeed, the same 
reasons calling for no deference to federal agencies under the act sug-
gest granting deference to the state agency overseeing the state 
CMP.113 
In summary, the language, regulations, and legislative history of 
108. 777 F. Supp. at 489. 
109. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 792-94 (3d ed. 1991). 
110. See supra notes 28, 97 and accompanying text. 
111. See William C. Banks & Kirk M. Lewis, Federalism Disserved: The Drive/or Deregula· 
tion, 45 Mo. L. REV. 141, 162 (1986) (citing S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1972), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4776-81); see also infra section III.C.2.a (discussing the 
policy of allowing state control of the coastal zone). 
112. In another context, the Seventh Circuit faced the dilemma of having two agencies offer-
ing competing conclusions under their statutory authority. In Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 
883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990), the court stated: "When the 
agency is the addressee of the statutory command, it takes the leading role in giving structure to 
the statute .•.. When two agencies claim to be the addressees, though, this allocation breaks 
down." 883 F.2d at 547 (emphasis added). In such a case, "a court could say that because the 
agencies disagree, neither is entitled to deference." 883 F.2d at 547. 
113. Some courts facing two agencies offering competing findings or interpretations have 
determined which agency deserves deference by examining the statute delegating authority. In 
Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commn., 499 U.S. 144 (1991), the Supreme 
Court examined the regulatory structure of the Occupational Safety and Health Act to determine 
whether courts should defer to the opinion of the Secretary of Labor or the Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission regarding the meaning of OSHA. The Court inferred from the 
structure and history of the Act that, because the Secretary was "to develop the expertise rele-
vant to assessing the effect of a particular regulatory interpretation," Congress had "intended to 
invest interpretive power" in the Secretary of Labor. 499 U.S. at 152-53. As this Note explains 
in section III.C.2.a, the CZMA intended to place the state, and thus the state agency, in a posi-
tion of control over the coastal zone. Thus, under Martin, the court should defer to the state 
agency. 
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the CZMA do not allocate the burden of proof. In addition, the veto 
concern raised by legislators and courts interpreting the CZMA may 
suggest that the federal agency should possess final authority to make 
a consistency determination, but the veto concern does not mandate 
placing the burden of proof on the state because other mechanisms 
avoid a state veto power. Finally, placing the final authority to make a 
consistency determination with the federal agencies does not require 
- as the AP A might suggest - that the courts defer to the federal 
agency's determination by placing the burden of proof on the states to 
show the determination was arbitrary or capricious. 
Because these textual sources do not provide clear guidance for 
resolving the allocation question, this Note next addresses other fac-
tors courts utilize to allocate burdens of proof. 
B. Access to Evidence and Probabilities 
Neither the federal agency nor the state has a clear advantage in 
access to evidence necessary for adjudicating a consistency dispute. 
The federal agency initially has superior access to evidence because it 
possesses the information regarding its own project that the determi-
nation re·quires. When provided to the state, the consistency determi-
nation gives the state the germane information as well. 114 In addition, 
a federal activity affecting the coastal zone would likely require the 
federal agency to prepare a comprehensive environmental impact 
statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act. 115 An 
EIS, which would be available to the state, includes extensive informa-
tion about environmental conditions in the affected area, thus further 
equalizing the access to knowledge of the federal activity. 116 
An example of a dispute illustrates why each party has roughly 
equivalent access to important information. 117 Assume the Depart-
ment of Interior provides a consistency determination for an offshore 
oil tract leasing program. The consistency determination would con-
tain "a detailed description of the activity, its associated facilities, and 
their coastal zone effects, and comprehensive data and information 
sufficient to support the Federal agency's consistency statement."118 
114. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
115. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. 1990)). Section 102 of NEPA requires 
agencies to consider environmental factors and consequences by requiring the preparation of an 
environmental impact statement whenever an agency proposes "major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). 
116. One might argue, however, that the federal agencies have an incentive to omit damaging 
information from consistency determinations and EISs. 
117. This example mirrors the factual setting of actual cases. See Conservation Law Found. 
v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), ajfd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st 
Cir. 1983); California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), modified, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th 
Cir. 1982), revel sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
118. 15 C.F.R. § 930.39(a) (1991). 
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Suppose the lease sale includes 100 tracts, 50 of which are "deep-sea 
tracts," for which the depth of the water exceeds 2000 feet. An oil rig 
in such a tract would require special drilling technology. Assume the 
state disagrees with the consistency determination, contending the ac-
tivity is inconsistent with a provision of the state CMP that requires 
offshore oil exploration, development, and production to minimize im-
pacts on the marine environment. In particular, the state contends 
that the Department of the Interior should abandon the deep-sea 
tracts because the necessary drilling technologies are unproven and 
impose an inordinate risk on important fishery resources. If the par-
ties do not resolve the disagreement and the state seeks judicial relief, 
assessing the relative access to evidence would not assist the court in 
allocating the burden of proof. Each party would likely have equal 
access to pertinent information and expertise regarding the effective-
ness of the drilling technology, information that presumably would be 
available in the market and not under the exclusive domain of either 
party. Because both parties have sophisticated knowledge of the rele-
vant evidence, this factor sheds little light on the allocation decision 
arising under the consistency provision of the CZMA. 
The factor that maintains that the burden of proof should be as-
signed to the party seeking to establish the improbable119 also provides 
little guidance; parties and courts have had too little experience with 
consistency disputes to be able to establish whether consistency or in-
consistency is the improbable contention. The types of disputes that 
arise with respect to the consistency determination occur infre-
quently.120 Moreover, only one case has reached the merits to deter-
mine whether an activity was consistent with a state CMP. 121 
Therefore, little data is available for judges to determine whether a 
contention is unusual. 
In summary, neither the "access to evidence" nor "probability" 
tests help resolve the issue of allocating the burden of proof. 
C. CZMA Policy Review 
Because other factors fail to provide definitive guidance concerning 
the burden of proof allocation, courts should evaluate the policies un-
119. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
120. Cases addressing this provision include Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 
312 (1984); Clark v. California, 464 U.S. 1304 (1983); Cross-Sound Ferry Serv., Inc. v. ICC, 934 
F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782 (4th 
Cir. 1988); Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988); New York 
v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 823 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Louisiana v. Lujan, 777 
F. Supp. 486 (E.D. La. 1991); Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), 
affd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
121. Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass), affd. sub nom. Massa-
chusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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derlying the CZMA to illuminate the allocation decision. 122 Two 
themes arise from an examination of the language and legislative his-
tory of the Act. First, the Act balances development and use of the 
coastal zone123 against preservation concerns. Second, the CZMA bal-
ances federal and state control in managing the coastal zone. Both 
themes are critical to an understanding of the consistency provision 
and to allocating the burden of proof. This section analyzes each 
theme first by examining the original policy of the CZMA, the con-
gressional reaffirmation of the original policy in the 1990 amendments, 
and judicial decisions construing the policy, and, second, by consider-
ing how each theme guides the allocation decision. 
1. Balancing Preservation and Development Interests 
a. Policy review: 1972 Act, 1990 Amendments, and judicial deci-
sions. In the congressional findings of the 1972 Act, Congress noted 
that the fundamental need for the CZMA arises from the "national 
interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and de-
velopment of the coastal zone."124 This statement indicates that the 
Act is foremost a balancing scheme; Congress sought to accommodate 
a number of competing concerns to ensure optimal use of the coastal 
zone resources. Examination of additional findings and legislative his-
tory, however, indicates that Congress intended the balance to favor 
protection. 
During consideration of coastal zone legislation, Congress learned 
of the danger the growing population of the U.S. coast posed to this 
resource. 125 By the mid-1950s, development pressures on the coast 
had destroyed twenty-five percent of the nation's coastal wetlands.126 
Increasing recreational and commercial demands endangered biologi-
cal organisms, and the deteriorating coastal water and wetlands qual-
ity threatened fish spawning grounds and nursery areas. 127 The Act's 
congressional findings addressed these concerns. 128 
122. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
123. This Note refers to these two factors simply as development. 
124. 16 U.S.C. § 145l(a) (1990). 
125. An estimated 106 million people - 53% of the U.S. population - lived within 50 miles 
of the coast in 1971. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4777. Estimates predicted that this population could reach 80% of the U.S. 
population by the year 2000. Id. More recent estimates indicate that the coastal population in 
1990 remained between 45 and 50% of the U.S. population and that this population will increase 
15% by the year 2010. 1 U.S. DEPT. COM. BIENNIAL REP. TO THE CONGRESS ON COASTAL 
ZONE MGMT. 1 (1992); COASTAL OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE, 1992, THE 1992 COASTAL 
STATUS REPORT: A PILOT STUDY OF THE U.S. COASTAL ZoNE AND ITS RESOURCES 6 (1992) 
[hereinafter COASTAL OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE]. 
126. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 4776, 
4777. 
127. Id. 
128. In pertinent part, the congressional findings stated: 
(c) The increasing and competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone 
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In addition to the political pressures these physical realities cre-
ated, a large and increasingly organized preservationist constituency 
influenced passage of the Act. During the 1960s, membership in the 
environmental movement grew rapidly. 129 As one commentator 
noted, "the cumulative impact of scientific and poetic insights . . . 
made ecology an everyday word, helped to elevate environmental pro-
tection to political respectability, and contributed to the eventual 
adoption of the Coastal Zone Management Act."130 
On the other hand, prodevelopment interests also exercised lever-
age over the passage of the Act. The influential "Stratton Report" 131 
favored resource development, stating: 
the key to more effective use of our coastland is the introduction of a 
management system permitting conscious and informed choices among 
development alternatives, providing for proper planning, and encourag-
ing recognition of the long-term importance of maintaining the quality of 
this productive region in order to ensure both its enjoyment and the 
sound utilization of its resources. 132 
The CZMA addressed development concerns in several ways. 
First, Congress weakened the mandate of the Act by making state par-
ticipation optional. 133 Second, Congress assigned the program to the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the over-
sight of the business-oriented Department of Commerce. 134 Third, the 
Act did not set substantive environmental performance standards. 135 
occasioned by population growth and economic development •.• have resulted in the loss of 
living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and adverse changes to eco-
logical systems, decreasing open space for public use, and shoreline erosion. 
(d) The habitat areas of the coastal zone, and the fish, shellfish, other living marine re-
sources, and wildlife therein, are ecologically fragile and consequently extremely vulnerable 
to destruction by man's alterations. 
(e) Important ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values in the coastal zone which are 
essential to the well-being of all citizens are being irretrievably damaged or lost. 
(g) Special natural and scenic characteristics are being damaged by ill-planned development 
that threatens these values. 
16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
129. See PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MOVEMENT 111-48 (1993); Fitzgerald, supra note 31, at 4-5. 
130. Zigurds L. Zile, A Legislative-Political History of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 
1972, l COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 235, 241 (1974). 
131. COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION 
AND THE SEA (1969) [hereinafter STRATTON REPORT]. Section 5 of the Marine Resources and 
Engineering Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-454, 80 Stat. 203 (1966), established this 
commission, known as the "Stratton Commission." The report the commission produced "per-
haps most directly contributed to the conception and passage of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act of 1972." Zile, supra note 130, at 256. 
132. STRATTON REPORT, supra note 131, at 49 (emphasis added). 
133. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 145l(i), 1452(2), 1454(a), 1455(a) (1988); 136 CONG. REC. E542 
(daily ed. March 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones) (emphasizing voluntary nature of program). 
134. H. REP. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1972); 15 C.F.R. §§ 923, 930 (1991); see 
also Zile, supra note 130, at 271, 273. 
135. See, e.g., Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 642 F. Supp. 393, 401 (M.D. Ala. 1985) noting the 
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Instead of emphasizing such performance requirements, Congress 
designed the Act primarily to create a management scheme to control 
various coastal zone uses. 136 Finally, Congress required states seeking 
approval of a CMP to show that they had considered the national in-
terest "in the siting of facilities . . . necessary to meet requirements 
which are other than local in nature."137 
Although prodevelopment interests exerted some influence, Con-
gress did not lose sight of the fact that ill-managed development and 
recreation had led to unimpeded degradation of the coastal zone.138 
The CZMA sought to change this status quo of unchecked harmful 
coastal activity by emphasizing effective state management of coastal 
activities. Congress also specifically called for the inclusion of proce-
dures for designating specific areas "for the purpose of preserving or 
restoring them for their conservation . . . ecological . . . or esthetic 
values."139 
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress endorsed the original preser-
vation policy of the Act: the "CZMA should continue to be a balanc-
ing statute which recognizes alternative uses of coastal zone resources, 
but at the same time ... all uses should be sensitive to the priority for 
maintaining natural systems in the coastal zone."140 The amended 
congressional findings underscored the coastal zone's fragile nature 
and susceptibility to human infiuence. 141 Additionally, Congress ad-
ded a section to the CZMA's policy declaration to reflect the environ-
mental-protection orientation of the legislation. The new section 
expressly declares that state CMPs must incorporate provisions to im-
"Act is more procedural in nature, requiring that states make 'conscious and informal choices 
among various alternatives' through the development of coastal zone management programs" 
(quoting S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 
4781)), revd. in part sub nom. Save Our Dunes v. Alabama Dept. ofEnvtl. Mgmt., 834 F.2d 984 
(11th Cir. 1987). Although the CZMA allows each state to tailor its own CMP to meet particu-
lar state needs, the Act sets some minimum content standards including "identification of the 
boundaries of the coastal zone subject to the [CMP]," 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(l) (1988); definition of 
the permissible land and water uses within the coastal zone, 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(2) (1988); 
designation of the ways the state will regulate different uses of the coastal zone, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1454(b)(4) (1988); and a "description of the organizational structure proposed to implement 
[the CMP]." 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(6) (1988). 
136. Nevertheless, states may develop substantive policies in their management schemes that 
are adverse to development interests. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text. 
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(8) (1988); see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. "Siting of 
facilities" presumably would be development oriented. 
138. See Randele Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regulation of Coastal Energy Facility 
Siting, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 568 (1980); supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(9) (Supp. IV 1992). For an explanation of approval requirements 
for Coastal Management Plans, of which this condition is a part, see also infra notes 161-62. 
140. 136 CONG. REC. H8073 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones) (emphasis 
added). 
141. Section 145l(d) states: "[t]he habitat areas of the coastal zone, and the fish, shellfish, 
other living marine resources, and wildlife therein, are ecologically fragile and consequently ex-
tremely vulnerable to destruction by man's alterations." 16 U.S.C. § 145l(d) (Supp. IV 1992). 
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prove, safeguard, and restore the quality of coastal waters, and to pro-
tect natural resources and existing uses of those waters.142 
The few courts that have interpreted the CZMA have generally 
emphasized the preservation goals of the Act. In American Petroleum 
Institute v. Knecht, 143 the court for the Central District of California 
denied the plaintiff oil trade association's suit to enjoin the grant of 
"final approval" of the California Coastal Zone Management Pro-
gram. The court stated: 
The CZMA was enacted primarily with a view to encouraging the 
coastal states to plan for the management, development, preservation, 
and restoration of their coastal zones by establishing rational processes 
by which to regulate uses therein. Although sensitive to balancing com-
peting interests, it was first and foremost a statute directed to and solici-
tous of environmental concems. 144 
In California v. Watt, 145 the District Court for the Central District 
of California enjoined the Department of Interior from conducting 
lease sales of OCS tracts off the California coast. The court supported 
its holding by referring to the purposes of the Act: "Special emphasis 
was placed on the objective of preserving the natural resources" within 
the coastal zone.146 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the 
consistency provision should be broadly construed to comply with the 
purposes of the Act, including "promot[ing] the preservation of natu-
ral resources in the coastal zone."147 
The CZMA plays primarily a protection role for the U.S. coastal 
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1992). In addition to general statements emphasizing 
the increasing need for protection of the coastal zone, the congressional conference concluded 
that specific coastal environmental threats included the insidious problems of nonpoint pollution 
and greenhouse warming that could lead to frequent coastal flooding. Coastal Zone 
Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. VI, subtit. c, § 6202(a), 104 
Stat. 1388-299 to 1388-319 (1990); 16 U.S.C. § 145l(k) (Supp. IV 1992) ("Land uses in the 
coastal zone, and the uses of adjacent lands which drain into the coastal zone, may significantly 
affect the quality of coastal waters and habitats, and efforts to control coastal water pollution 
from land use activities must be improved."); 16 U.S.C. § 1455(b) (Supp. IV 1992) (adopting a 
provision requiring states to develop programs to protect coastal waters from nonpoint pollution 
from adjacent coastal land uses); 16 U.S.C. § 1451(1) (Supp. 1991) ("Because global warming 
may result in a substantial sea level rise with serious adverse effects in the coastal zone, coastal 
states must anticipate and plan for such an occurrence."). 
143. 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978), a.ffd., 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979). 
144. 456 F. Supp. at 919. 
145. 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), modified, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), revd. sub 
nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). 
146. 520 F. Supp. at 1369. 
147. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982), revd. on other grounds sub nom. 
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); see also Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., 
Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("The [CZMA] seeks to protect the land and 
water resources of the nation's coastal zone .... "); Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. 
EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 793 (4th Cir. 1988) (the CZMA was "designed to encourage states to de-
velop land-use planning programs that will preserve, protect, and restore the environment of 
their coastal zones"). 
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resources. Courts should recognize this protection-oriented balance in 
making burden of proof allocation decisions. 
b. Implications for the allocation decision. Effectuating Con-
gress's preservation goal requires federal agencies to bear the burden 
of proof in any disputes arising over a section 307(c)(l) consistency 
determination.148 An examination of how courts allocated the risk of 
nonpersuasion during the unabashed prodevelopment period preced-
ing the enactment of the CZMA, and how the courts modified burden 
allocation after the beginning of the environmental era, underscores 
this conclusion. 149 When the courts interpreted law to sanction indus-
trial progress at the expense of resource protection, a plaintiff seeking 
to enjoin or limit a development activity, typically on a nuisance the-
ory, had to overcome the prodevelopment status quo to succeed.150 
Accordingly, the plaintiff would bear the burden of proof. Prior to the 
"environmental era" courts and litigants accepted this situation. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, increased environmental consciousness led 
Congress's preferences away from seeking unimpeded development 
and toward recognizing the dangers of pollution and depletion of natu-
ral resources. 151 The status quo became one in which development 
interests had to account for the adverse environmental effects of their 
activities; the new status quo valued guardianship over the nation's 
natural resources. 152 Furthermore, statutes suggested that those pur-
suing unchecked progress advanced a disfavored proposition. 153 Thus, 
parties seeking to conduct developmental activities had to show that 
148. This contention assumes that f~eral agencies conduct development-oriented activities. 
Disputes have not arisen when the state, under the auspices of the CZMA, calls into question 
protection-oriented federal activities. If such a dispute were to arise, the courts would have to 
balance the proprotection aspects of the Act with the state-control aspects. See infra section 
111.C.2. Congress apparently intended the CZMA primarily as a proprotection Act that grants 
states control over the coastal zone, rather than a state-control statute that happens to take 
protection concerns into account. The legislative history indicates that Congress grappled with a 
number of options to protect coastal resources, including a federal land-use act, but finally settled 
on vesting primary responsibility with the states. See Eichenberg & Archer, supra note 31; infra 
notes 156-60 and accompanying text. Therefore, a state should bear the burden of proving that a 
proprotection federal activity is inconsistent with the state CMP. 
149. Cf. Martin H. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back the Bur-
den of Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1984); Krier, supra note 26, at 107. Belsky discusses three 
eras of environmental law with different allocations of burdens of proof: in the years preceding 
the 1960s, the burden of proof rested with those who sought to inhibit development; in the 1960s 
and 1970s an environmental era developed resulting in several statutes that shifted the burden to 
those utilizing or polluting natural resources; and in the 1980s there was a shift back to 
prodevelopment interests and a resulting movement of the burden of proof onto those seeking 
protection of natural resources. Belsky, supra. 
150. See Belsky, supra note 149, at 5-12; Krier, supra note 26, at 107. 
151. See SHABECOFF, supra note 129, at 129; Belsky, supra note 149, at 12-36. 
152. See SHABECOFF, supra note 129, at 110, 129-34. 
153. Cf. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). 
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they had accounted for environmental effects. 154 
The CZMA extended this policy to the management of coastal re-
sources; the 1990 amendments to the CZMA reaffirmed this policy. 
Courts should acknowledge Congress's perception of the status quo as 
one in which states shall protect the coastal zone, and courts should 
recognize that those who seek to develop the coastal zone pursue an 
activity disfavored by the CZMA's policy. Consequently, because the 
federal agency seeking to exploit undeveloped coastal resources coun-
ters the status quo and opposes the CZMA's primary preservation 
goal, it should bear the burden of proof. 
2. Balancing State and Federal Control 
a. Policy review: 1972 Act, 1990Amendments, and judicial deci-
sions. Although Congress propounded an environmental protection 
goal in the 1972 Act, it intended to give primary responsibility to the 
states to make the specific decisions regarding protection. 155 Congress 
determined that state control, rather than a national regulatory 
scheme, would best effectuate the purposes of the Act. Because of the 
national interest in coastal management, however, Congress deter-
mined that some federal input was necessary. 
Prior to the Act, national, state, and local political bodies exercised 
varying degrees of control over the coastal zone with considerable do-
minion lying with local jurisdictions.156 Congress found this joint ex-
ercise of authority "too diffuse in focus, neglected in importance and 
inadequate in the regulatory authority needed to do the job."157 The 
Act sought to remedy these inadequacies by "adopt[ing] the States as 
the focal point for developing comprehensive plans and implementing 
management programs for the coastal zone."158 Congress viewed the 
154. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 629 n.49 (10th Cir. 1990). 
155. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) states the policy objective as: 
to encourage and assist the states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal 
zone through the development and implementation of management programs to achieve 
wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone, giving full consideration to 
ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values as well as to needs for economic develop-
ment .... 
See also S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 
4776 ("The intent of this legislation is to enhance state authority by encouraging and assisting 
the states to assume planning and regulatory powers over their coastal zones."). 
156. Congress found "the coastal zone is a politically complex area, involving local, state, 
regional, national, and international political interests. At present, local governments do possess 
considerable authority in the coastal zone. However, frequently their jurisdiction does not ex-
tend far enough to deal fully and effectively with the ... problems of that zone." S. REP. No. 
753, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4779. 
157. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 
4781. 
158. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5·6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 
4780 (emphasis added). The report also noted: "It is believed that the States do have the re-
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states as the appropriate midpoint between federal and local control159 
because national interests could be accommodated while states could 
attend to the local nature of coastal decisions. 160 
Although the Act leaves to the state the development of a CMP, 
the approval stage of a state's CMP takes into account federal inter-
ests. The state must show the Secretary of Commerce that it has con-
sulted federal agencies fully in developing the plan, 161 and that the 
sources, administrative machinery enforcement powers, and constitutional authority on which to 
build a sound coastal zone management program." Id. 
In the mid-1960s, a debate raged over the proper extent of national control over the manage-
ment of the coastal zone. See Zile, supra note 130, at 241-67. Early drafts of the Estuary Protec-
tion Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-454, 82 Stat. 625 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1226 (1988)), 
gave substantial powers to the federal government to protect the coastal zone. See H.R. 11236, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 15770, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 13447, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 25, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Versions of the bill favoring extensive 
federal involvement met strong opposition from states asserting federalism concerns. See Zile, 
supra note 130, at 248-49. By 1970, Congress displayed "a newly proclaimed faith in the good 
intentions of the states" arising from the "perception of politically feasible congressional action"; 
Congress could not circumvent or ignore state concerns regarding control of their coastal re-
sources. Id. at 261. In addition, "[t]he fact that ... federal studies .... had stressed state 
sovereignty, undoubtedly influenced the legislators." Id.; see also SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 
THE NATIONAL EsTuARINE POLLUTION STUDY, s. Doc. No. 58, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) 
(emphasizing a state role in management of the coastal zone with federal assistance provided to 
the states to develop and implement the states' management programs); 1 BUREAU OF SPORT 
FISHERIES & WILDLIFE AND BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTE-
RIOR, NATIONAL EsruARY STUDY 76 (1970) (finding that "the Coastal and Great Lakes States 
are the keys to successful estuary preservation and restoration"); STRATTON REPORT, supra note 
131, at 56 (indicating that the states should be "the focus of responsibility and action" in a 
coastal management system). 
159. Local authorities were denied exclusive control because the local governmental bodies 
were too beholden to economic influences. See S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4779-80. 
160. The application of states' CMPs on a case-by-case basis "provides a reasonable frame-
work for decision making, given the breadth of the geographic area covered by state coastal 
programs and the complexity and number of factors that need to be taken into consideration." 
Robert W. Knecht, Coastal Zone Management: The First Five Years and Beyond, 6 COASTAL 
ZONE MGMT. J. 259, 265 (1979). "The states were selected as the 'key' participants ... because 
of their 'considerable constitutional authority' over land and water resources and uses." Jack 
Archer & Joan Bondareff, Implementation of the Federal Consistency Doctrine - Lawful and 
Constitutional: A Response to Whitney. Johnson & Per/es, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 117 
(1988). 
161. The Act states: 
Prior to granting approval of a management program submitted by a coastal state, the Sec-
retary shall find that: (l) The state has developed and adopted a management program for 
its coastal zone in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary, after 
notice, and with the opportunity of full participation by relevant Federal agencies, state 
agencies, local governments, regional organizations, port authorities, and other interested 
parties, public and private, which is adequate to carry out the purposes of this chapter .... 
16 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1988), amended by 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (Supp. IV 1992). In addition, 
"[t]he Secretary shall not approve the management program ... unless the views of Federal 
agencies principally affected by such program have been adequately considered." 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1456(b) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1049, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972), reprinted in SEN-
ATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COASTAL 
ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, at 321 (Comm. Print 1976) ("[I]f the program as developed 
is to be approved and thereby enable the State to receive funding assistance under this title, the 
State must take into account and must accommodate its program to the specific requirements of 
various Federal laws which are applicable to its coastal zone."). 
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CMP considers the national interest in siting energy facilities on the 
coast.162 In addition, after approval of a CMP, the Secretary of Com-
merce may review the CMP and the performance of the state. 163 If the 
state does not adhere to the approved program, the Secretary may ter-
minate financial assistance granted to the state under section 306 of 
the CZMA. 164 Aside from this limited federal control, the state is free 
to regulate its coastal areas as it wishes. 
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress reaffirmed the original policy 
of the Act to vest control of the coastal zone with the states. Congress 
emphasized that the increasing stress placed on the coastal zone was 
"creating the need for resolution of serious conflicts among important 
and competing uses and values in coastal and ocean waters."165 
Although Congress indicated it favored protection of the coastal zone 
over development of this resource, 166 it did not attempt directly to 
resolve the "conflicts" within the CZMA. Rather, Congress entrusted 
to the coastal states the role of resolving specific conflicts due to their 
proximity to and economic reliance upon the coastal zone. 167 
Additionally, the adoption of new provisions in the 1990 Amend-
ments to assist and guide states in conducting effective management 
programs supports the conclusion that Congress intended coastal 
states to play the primary role in coastal zone management. The 
amendments provide funds for administration of management 
plans, 168 grant additional CMP development funds to promote state 
participation, 169 and provide "Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants" to 
improve states' CMPs in areas of national interest,17° 
162. 16 u.s.c. § 1455(d)(8) (1988). 
To the extent that a State program does not recognize these overall national interests, as 
well as the specific national interest in [energy facilities] or is construed as conflicting with 
any applicable statute, the Secretary may not approve the State program until it is amended 
to recognize those Federal rights, powers, and interests. 
H.R. REP. No. 1049, supra note 161, at 18. 
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1458 (Supp. II 1990). 
164. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455, 1458 (Supp. II 1990). 
165. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(f) (Supp. IV 1992). 
166. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
167. The Act states: 
Because of their proximity to and reliance upon the ocean and its resources, the coastal 
states have substantial and significant interests in the protection, management, and develop-
ment of the resources of the exclusive economic zone that can only be served by the active 
participation of coastal states in all Federal programs affecting such resources and, wherever 
appropriate, by development of state ocean resource plans as part of their federally approved 
coastal zone management programs. 
16 U.S.C. § 145l{m) (Supp. IV 1992). 
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (Supp. IV 1992). 
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (Supp. IV 1992). 
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1456{b) (Supp. IV 1992). The areas of national interest included protecting 
and managing coastal wetlands, managing natural hazards such as sea level rise, improving pub-
lic access to the coast, assessing the impacts of coastal growth and development, and siting of 
coastal energy facilities in an environmentally sound manner. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (Supp. IV 
1992). 
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The amended consistency provision also establishes Congress's in-
tent to vest control over the coastal zone in the states. The Supreme 
Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 171 by removing a large 
class of federal activities from consistency review, restricted states' 
ability vis-a-vis federal activities to protect and manage the coastal 
zone. 172 Congress responded to this restriction by indicating clearly 
that federal activities affecting the coastal zone are subject to the re-
quirements of state CMPs. As stated in the conference report accom-
panying the new legislation, the provision 
amends the "federa1 consistency" provisions to overturn the Supreme 
Court's 1984 decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California. This 
would clarify that a11 federa1 agency activities, whether in or outside of 
the coasta1 zone, are subject to the consistency requirements of section 
307(c)(l) of the CZMA if they affect natura1 resources, land uses, or 
water uses in the coasta1 zone. 173 
Thus, a federal agency would no longer easily subvert a state's control 
over the coastal zone by claiming that the federal activity fell outside 
the purview of the consistency provision. 
Statements by supporters of the House bill further demonstrate 
that the new consistency provision served to reassert the states' key 
position under the Act. As stated by Representative Hertel, cosponsor 
of the House bill, "any Federal agency activity in the coastal zone is 
subject to consistency review, as long as that activity can conceivably 
have an effect on the coastal zone. This includes OCS lease sales and 
any other Federal activity that may have an effect on the coastal 
zone."174 This clarifies the "congressional intent regarding State re-
view of Federal actions in coastal waters."175 Moreover, Representa-
tive Studds, a ranking member of the Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries that sponsored the bill, stated that the amended consis-
tency provision 
sweeps aside a misguided attempt by this administration and the last to 
shackle the ability of States to protect their coastlines from Federal agen-
cies that may - or may not - care about how their activities affect 
State coasta1 zones .... [T]he issue boils down to a very simple proposi-
tion: That Federa1 agencies should be required to tailor their activities to 
mesh as much as possible with State efforts to protect the coast. 176 
This statement further suggests that Congress decided to place power 
over the coastal resources into the hands of the states because of a 
sense that federal agencies do not take into consideration the effects-
171. 464 U.S. 312 (1984); see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
172. Eichenberg & Archer, supra note 31, at 67; Fitzgerald, supra note 31, at 18. 
173. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1990, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 5835, lOlst 
Cong., 2d. Sess. 968 (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. H12694 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990). 
174. 136 CONG. REC. H8081 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hertel). 
175. Id. 
176. 136 CONG. REc. at H8083 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement by Rep. Studds). 
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that is, the costs-borne by coastal states when development projects 
affect coastal areas. Indeed, as Studds suggests, although the federal 
agencies may understand the benefits of the activities from a national 
perspective, they are apt to ignore or underestimate the local costs. 
Requiring the federal agencies to consider state CMPs through the 
consistency provisions forces agencies to consider local costs. 
Courts also have recognized the Act's focus on state control over 
coastal areas. In American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 177 the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California explained that "the 
primary focus of the legislation [is] the need for a rational planning 
process to enable the state ... to be able to make 'hard choices.' " 178 
The court recognized that Congress considered the states best suited 
to make the difficult balancing decisions between developing and pro-
tecting the coast. 
In Cross-Sound Ferry Service, Inc. v. LC. C., 179 the Circuit Court 
for the District of Columbia stated that Congress sought to protect the 
nation's coastal zone "through a cooperative governmental effort in 
which states are given primary responsibility for developing coastal 
resource management programs."180 Similarly, in California v. 
Watt, 181 the Ninth Circuit noted that each coastal state has "[primary] 
authority over the lands and waters in [its] coastal zone ... to be 
exercised 'in cooperation with Federal and local governments and 
other vitally affected interests.' "182 
The CZMA gives states the primary role in managing the coastal 
177. 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978), ajfd., 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979). 
178. 456 F. Supp. at 919 (emphasis added). 
179. 934 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
180. 934 F.2d at 334. 
181. 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom Secretary of the Interior v. Watt, 464 U.S. 
312 (1984). 
182. 683 F.2d at 1260 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 145l(i)); see also California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 
1359, 1369 (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("[P]rimary authority in the management scheme is to be bestowed 
upon those coastal states which develop and implement comprehensive management programs 
.•.. "), modified, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), revd. sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. 
California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). The district court in Watt maintained that the consistency pro-
vision provided the foremost incentive for states to adopt coastal management programs. A quid 
pro quo was intended in the CZMA: "the state agencies are to participate actively in designing 
the state management program, and, in return, the federal agencies 'shall conduct' their activities 
'in a manner which is, to the maximum extent possible, consistent' with the state's program." 
520 F. Supp. at 1370 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)). The federal interest is 
protected through federal agencies' power to influence in the approval stage the policy choices 
that become part of a CMP. 520 F. Supp. at 1369. Once the federal government has exercised 
this power, however, control over the coastal zone, via the consistency requirements, passes to 
the states. See California v. Watt, 683 F.2d at 1260; see also California v. Mack, 693 F. Supp. 
821, 826 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that "NOAA's regulations implementing the CZMA reflect 
the sense that the states shall have primary control over their programs"); Save Our Dunes v. 
Pegues, 642 F. Supp. 393, 401 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (finding that the "CZMA's 'intent .•. is to 
enhance state authority,' not 'diminish' it through federal regulation and control" (quoting S. 
REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4776)). 
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zone. Courts should recognize this state-control balance in making 
burden of proof allocation decisions. 
b. Implications for the allocation decision. To further Con-
gress's policy of vesting control over the coastal zone with the states, 
federal agencies should bear the burden of proof in consistency dis-
putes. This section first explains that this solution would accord ap-
propriate respect to the value judgments the CZMA requires states to 
make. It then demonstrates that the solution would not hinder federal 
interests in the coastal zone because such interests are protected dur-
ing the approval stage of states' CMPs, and, in certain instances, 
through a presidential override of state interests. 
Congress supported the idea of protecting the coastal zone but 
placed the specific case-by-case management of development versus 
protection conflicts in the hands of the ·state governments. 183 The 
states are to manage the coastal zone to protect their resources and to 
allow for development.184 Obviously these demands on the coastal 
zone might conflict, 185 thus requiring the states to decide between the 
competing merits of protecting or exploiting the coastal zone. But, as 
long as state management plans meet minimum standards for ap-
proval, 186 the states have significant discretion to balance the conflict-
ing claims on the coast. 
Under the CZMA scheme, states measure the costs and benefits of 
coastal protection against the costs and benefits of activities that 
threaten the coast. 187 States have discretion to decide how much their 
citizens value preserving pristine coastal areas for future generations, 
confining residential development to areas removed from the beach, or 
mandating consideration of alternative energy sources in lieu of off-
shore oil drilling in certain tracts. The states may also determine costs 
incurred in protecting the coast, such as the costs of forgoing eco-
nomic development. Because it is difficult to quantify many costs and 
benefits in monetary terms, 188 the state may make conceptual value 
183. Certainly, Congress weighted the scale it gave to the states-that is, the CMP approval 
guidelines-in favor of consideration of protection of the coastal resource. Thus, Congress en-
sured that its own interest in protection was considered. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455(d)(9)-(ll) (1990). 
184. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra notes 124-39 and accompanying text. 
186. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1990); supra notes 135, 161. 
187. One may view Congress's mandate to the states to formulate coastal plans in a slightly 
different way. Congress enacted coastal zone legislation because of the risks posed by unimpeded 
development, yet Congress did not assess the risks involved. Instead, Congress may have decided 
that states were better able to make judgments regarding the relevant risks along their coastal 
zones. If a state perceives a greater risk from nondevelopment than might the federal govern-
ment, then the state would incorporate this judgment into a more lenient CMP. If the risk to the 
environment appears as a greater threat than the risks of nondevelopment, then the state would 
adopt a more stringent CMP. 
188. EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COs-r ANALYSIS 4 (1990). 
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judgments. For instance, a state may find it difficult to quantify the 
local costs of accepting the risk of an oil spill from offshore develop-
ment. Thus, the state may determine simply that its citizens place a 
high value on minimizing the risk of such oil spills but also value the 
benefits of energy development. To reconcile these competing values, 
the state may place certain risk-minimizing restrictions on offshore oil 
production to allow safer energy development.189 
Different states may strike different balances between protection 
and development when they incorporate their value judgments into 
CMPs.19° Congress both expects and desires this result; one purpose 
of the CZMA is to allow the cost-benefit analyses to reflect the differ-
ence in circumstances between the coastal states.191 Once states in-
corporate these diverse judgments into CMPs, the consistency 
provisions ensure that the federal government respects them. 
The consistency requirement forces federal agencies to consider 
costs federal activities impose on states, as recognized by state 
CMPs.192 States largely, if not exclusively, bear the costs of certain 
federal government activities affecting the coastal zone. 193 States iden-
tify these costs in the process of formulating and seeking approval of 
CMPs. 194 In contrast, the nation often receives a larger portion of the 
benefits from the exploitation of the coastal zone, especially with re-
spect to energy production that benefits the nation by lessening depen-
dence on foreign sources. 195 In such cases, federal agencies will tend 
189. See Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), a.ffd. sub nom. 
Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). 
190. Kanouse, supra note 138, at 560-61; Kenneth W. Swenson, Note, A Stitch in Time: The 
Continental Shelf. Environmental Ethnics, and Federalism, 60 S. CALL. REV. 851, 864 (1987). 
191. Congress did not ignore interests that extended beyond the confines of a particular state. 
The Act takes national interests into account when the state's plan is developed and then ap-
proved. If certain conditions are not met, such as allowing federal agency input, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1455(d)(l) (1990), the state plan will not be approved. Because an approved state plan, by 
definition, does take national interests into account, this strengthens the argument that deference 
should be afforded to the state's judgment concerning the expected benefits of protecting the 
coast, or the costs of allowing development. 
192. See infra note 196. In other words, the CZMA accounts for externalities by allowing 
state governments to exert some control over the federal government. This trade-off is similar to 
the federal government's interfering with the free market in order to account for externalities. 
See generally GRAMLICH, supra note 188, at 18. 
193. In some instances, of course, the nation bears the cost of losing valuable coastal re-
sources. However, coastal states disproportionately bear the cost of activities affecting the 
coastal zone. See COASTAL OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE, supra note 125, at 53 (discussing 
environmental costs of oil and gas exploration); Fitzgerald, supra note 31, at 1-2, 30, 34-35, 39, 
41; Richard Grosso, Federal Offshore Leasing: States' Concerns Fall on Deaf Ears, 2 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 249, 249, 280 (1986); Daniel S. Miller, Comment, Offihore Federalism: Evolv· 
ing Federal-State Relations in Offehore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 414 
(1984); supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
194. Even though the states may not in reality be the best cost identifiers, Congress neverthe· 
less gave them the opportunity to make that value judgment - to weigh how the citizenry per-
ceives the importance of coastal zone protection. Kanouse, supra note 138, at 560-61. 
195. In addition to decreasing dependence on foreign oil and gas supplies, the federal govern-
ment receives a direct benefit from leasing OCS tracts. Between 1971 and 1990, the U.S. Treas-
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to favor national benefits to the detriment of local interests. 
Because state CMPs have encoded the states' consideration of de-
velopment costs, courts should not force further justification of this 
assessment. Rather, courts should require the federal agency to show 
that the benefits of the activity in question outweigh the costs as ex-
pressed in the CMP.196 If a federal agency contends that its activities 
ury received over $89.3 billion from offshore leasing. COASTAL OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE, 
supra note 125, at 52; see also Swenson, supra note 190, at 864. 
196. State value judgments and perceptions of cost determine the types of restrictions on 
coastal activities a CMP will impose. For example, Florida's CMP-a compilation of state stat-
utes and rules that existed before the implementation of the state's CMP, FLA. STAT. ch. 
380.21(2) (1987)-reveals the state's concern over costs resulting from federal activity harming 
sensitive coastal and marine environments and recreation resources. The CMP requires federal 
agencies to consider effects on the many reefs and other coastal and marine environments that 
are considered sensitive environmental areas. Telephone Interview with Jasmin Raffington, Flor-
ida Federal Consistency Coordinator (Sept. 23, 1993); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 380.05 (1987) 
(defining the process for designating areas of critical state concern). Most Florida coastal areas 
that could be used for federal activities, such as OCS oil and gas leasing, are in close proximity to 
such sensitive areas, and therefore the federal agency must take special precautions to ensure 
consistency with the provisions protecting these resources. Telephone Interview with Jasmin 
Raffington, supra. In addition, because of the many submerged historic shipwrecks off the Flor-
ida coast, federal agencies must show consistency with historic preservation provisions. See FLA. 
STAT. ch. 267 (1992). Florida's CMP also takes into account such issues as recreation and 
coastal pollution. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. chs. 258-259, 375-376, 403 (1992). For an examination 
of the different issues Florida has raised in consistency disputes over federal OCS leasing, see 
MALCOLM M. SIMMONS & GEORGE A. COSTELLO, CONSISTENCY REVIEW OF OUTER CONTI-
NENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES: SELECTED CASE STUDIES, 1982-1984, at 43-44, 
48-50 (Congressional Research Service No. 85-960 ENR, 1985). See generally Daniel W. 
O'Connell, Florida's Struggle for Approval Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 25 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 61 (1985) {discussing Florida's difficulty in developing a CMP). 
The primary concern Oregon's CMP addresses is habitat preservation. Telephone Interview 
with Emily S. Toby, Coastal Specialist, Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Develop-
ment (Sept. 23, 1993). Under Oregon's CMP, federal agencies conducting activities must con-
sider Oregon's Statewide Planning Goals, approved local government plans, and other state 
statutory authorities. OREGON COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 2 (undated, available from 
the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development). The federal activity receiving 
the most attention in Oregon-OCS leasing activity is nonexistent off Oregon's coast-is the 
Bureau of Land Management's plans, which must be consistent with, among other Oregon en-
forceable policies, habitat preservation goals. Telephone Interview with Emily S. Tody, supra. 
See generally OREGON COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, supra, at 31-33; OREGON LAND 
CONSERVATION & DEV. CoMMN., OREGON'S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS, Goals 5, 16-17, 
19 (1993). In addition to habitat preservation, which implicitly addresses the cost of harming 
salmon and other species, Oregon's CMP recognizes that not protecting the coast threatens the 
state's increasingly important tourism industry. See OREGON COASTAL MANAGEMENT PRO-
GRAM, supra, at 3. 
The Massachusetts CMP recognizes the value of tourism but also places heavy emphasis on 
ensuring that the state's coastal fisheries are protected from the effects of federal activities, pri-
marily ocs oil and gas leasing. See, e.g., MASS. COASTAL ZONE MGMT., COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASS., CZM ON OFFSHORE OIL: A SHORT HISTORY OF CZM's INVOLMENT IN ISSUES RE-
LATED TO OFFSHORE DRILLING (undated); MASS. COASTAL ZONE MGMT., COMMONWEALTH 
OF MASS., COASTAL BRIEF, MCZM: A COMPREHENSIVE TOOL To PROTECT MARINE RE-
SOURCES 2 (1991). Concern over effects on the state's fisheries prompted the consistency dispute 
that culminated in Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), affd. sub 
nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). That case considered policy number 
nine of the Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management Program, which states that federal agencies 
must be consistent with the state's policy to: 
a. Accommodate exploration, development and production of offshore oil and gas resources 
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will be consistent over the objections of states, the court should require 
the federal agency to show that it properly accounted for the state 
costs. Courts can effect this result by allocating the burden of proof 
regarding consistency to the federal agencies. 
Placing the burden of proof on federal agencies does not unduly 
burden them. The legislative scheme provides for cooperation be-
tween states and federal agencies at the CMP approval stage and, in 
some cases, allows a presidential override. 197 In routine conflicts, 
however, the most plausible reading of the statute suggests the state 
interest should take precedence. In the context of a typical dispute, 
therefore, the burden of proof should lie with the less favored interest: 
that which the federal agency advances. Once a CMP is approved -
implying that the states have made a well-reasoned judgment on how 
to manage a coast and have taken national interests into account -
the federal government should be required to respect the judgments in 
the plan it has approved or to prove why such respect should not be 
accorded in a particular situation. 
In short, because control over the coastal zone is vested in the 
states and federal interests are otherwise protected, the courts should 
defer to state judgments by placing the burden of proof on federal 
agencies. Otherwise, by placing the burden of proof on the states to 
prove inconsistency, courts would undermine the balancing decisions 
that the states are entitled and encouraged to make. Such an alloca-
tion would weaken the primary incentive for state participation: re-
quired federal consistency.19s 
while minimizing impacts on the marine enviroment, especially on fisheries, water quality 
and wildlife, and on the recreational values of the coast .... 
b. Evaluate indigenous or alternative sources of energy ... and offshore mining to minimize 
adverse impacts on the marine environment, especially with respect to fisheries, water 
quality, and wildlife, and on the recreational values of the coast. 
MASSACHUSETTS COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM POLICIES, Policies 9(a)-9(b) 
(1978). 
This limited appraisal of three state CMPs indicates that states face different costs from 
coastal development and accordingly emphasize different concerns in their CMPs. Similar varia-
tions certainly occur in other state CMPs. See Kanouse, supra note 138, at 560-61; Kem Lowry 
et al., Federal-State Coordination in Coastal Management: An Assessment of the Federal Consis-
tency Provision of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 19 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 97, 100 
(1993); Michael A. Wolf, Accommodating Tensions in the Coastal Zone, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
7, 14-15 (1985) (quoting Gladwin Hill, Federal Law on Coastal Land Use, After 12 Years, ls 
Having Wide Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1984, at A36). Courts should require federal agen-
cies to take into account the coastal resource issues each state regard as important. For addi-
tional examples of state consistency concerns, see SIMMONS & COSTELLO, supra. 
197. The act "encourage[s] the participation and cooperation of the public, state and local 
governments ... as well as of the Federal agencies having programs affecting the coastal zone, in 
carrying out the purposes of this chapter." 16 U.S.C. § 1452(4) (Supp. II 1990); see also 136 
CONG. REC. H8101 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Pallone) ("It is clear that under 
the CZMA, the whole idea is to have cooperation between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment."); supra notes 44, 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing presidential override). 
198. See supra notes 12, 182. 
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IV. ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE 
FEDERAL AGENCY 
475 
No single factor that courts use to allocate burdens of proof indis-
putably points to the appropriate allocation in a section 307(c)(l) con-
sistency dispute. Ultimately, to resolve the issue properly courts must 
consider the CZMA's policy, 199 which convincingly points toward al-
locating the burden to the federal agency. Allocation to the federal 
agency would help effectuate the CZMA's policy of granting to states 
control over the coastal zone and favoring protection over develop-
ment interests in the coastal zone. 200 
Other issues raised in Part Ill's analysis of the factors courts use in 
allocating the burden of proof, however, suggest that the allocation 
solution needs fine tuning. The examination of the language, regula-
tions, and legislative history revealed the concern that granting states 
too much control over the coastal zone would enable them unilaterally 
to halt-that is, to veto-federal activities.201 Moreover, this exami-
nation indicated that the federal agency makes the final prelitigation 
consistency determination that would normally require deference by 
the courts.202 This Note considered and disposed of arguments arising 
from these issues that pointed toward allocating the burden of proof to 
the states.203 Nevertheless, the arguments have some merit. It is pos-
sible, though, to alleviate the concerns over the veto issue and to give 
due respect to the federal agency's determination while keeping the 
ultimate burden of proof on the federal agency. Courts should require 
the state to make some initial showing - meet some initial burden of 
production - that demonstrates that the federal agency's activity is 
inconsistent with the state CMP. 204 The court should require the state 
to present the federal consistency determination and the state's official 
response objecting to the determination and indicating reasonable al-
ternatives that would make the federal activity consistent.205 Upon 
199. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra section 111.C. 
201. See supra section 111.A.2. 
202. See supra section 111.A.3. The factors considering ease of access to evidence and who 
must prove the improbable provided no guidance to the allocation decision. 
203. See supra notes 87, 91-92, 110-13 and accompanying text. 
204. One easily imagined initial showing would be to make out a prima facie case that the 
federal activity is inconsistent. The state would advance sufficient evidence regarding why it 
found the federal agency activity inconsistent with its coastal management plan. If the judge 
decides that a reasonable jury could find in the state's favor, the state has met its prima facie 
burden and creates a presumption of inconsistency. After the state establishes a prima facie case, 
the federal agency would then have the responsibility to rebut the state's allegations, the ultimate 
burden of persuasion remaining with the federal agency. Accordingly, the state should prevail if 
the agency does not advance evidence to rebut the prima facie case, or if the agency evidence is 
not sufficient to meet the ultimate burden of persuasion. See supra note 77 and accompanying 
text. 
205. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Such a presentation should be sufficient 
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this showing, the federal agency should have the responsibility to re-
but the state's allegations with the ultimate burden of persuasion lying 
with the federal agency.206 
Placing an initial burden of production on the state prevents it 
from controlling federal agency activities too easily. If the state is not 
encumbered by this burden, it will merely have to plead that the 
agency activity is inconsistent to shift the burdens of production and 
persuasion to the federal agency. Moreover, to avoid a system of in-
centives encouraging the states to seek judicial resolution of even the 
most minor consistency disputes, the state should bear some eviden-
tiary costs to lay out a reasonable disagreement with the federal 
agency. 
Allocating the initial burden of production to the state, but shifting 
the ultimate burden of persuasion to the federal agency, best achieves 
the overall policies of the Act. This rule upholds the protection inter-
ests of the CZMA and vests primary control with the states without 
giving them a wholesale veto power over federal activities. The bur-
den-shifting solution also discourages states from bringing weak 
claims to the federal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The coastal resources of the United States will likely continue to 
face a barrage of environmentally detrimental attacks. The population 
near the coast will expand, thus prompting additional development 
pressures. The national need for recreation, energy, and sustenance 
will also lead to further demands to exploit coastal resources. Such 
pressures will likely lead to more frequent conflicts between states and 
the federal government, resulting in more numerous consistency dis-
putes between federal agencies and coastal states under the Coastal 
Zone Management Act. 
Currently, no sources clearly indicate who bears the burden of 
proof when such consistency disputes come before a court. The 
CZMA does not explicitly allocate the burden of proof,207 and courts 
are divided on who bears the burden.208 To determine the proper allo-
cation, this Note examined methods that courts use in allocating bur-
dens of proof2°9 and considered their application to litigation under 
CZMA section 307(c)(l).210 No single method unequivocally indi-
for establishing a likelihood of success on the merits to obtain a preliminary injunction. See 
supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
206. This solution is equivalent to that found in certain disputes under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
207. See supra section III.A.I. 
208. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra Part II. 
210. See supra Part III. 
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cated who should bear the burden of proof in a consistency dispute. 
Guidance gleaned from the language, regulations, and legislative his-
tory of the CZMA weighed only slightly in favor of allocating the bur-
den to the state.211 Ease of access to evidence did not tip the scale in 
either direction.212 Considering probabilities was equally inconclu-
sive.213 In the end, the policy of the CZMA most clearly indicated 
who should bear the burden.214 To effectuate the policy of the statute, 
which favors preservation over development interests and vests pri-
mary control over the coastal zone with the states, the federal agency 
should bear the ultimate burden of persuasion in a consistency dispute. 
To prevent the state from exercising excessive influence over federal 
activities, however, the states should bear an initial burden of produc-
ing evidence to show that a legitimate dispute exists.215 
Placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the federal agency will best 
allow the states to account for the demands placed on their coastal 
zone by the federal government. Assigning the initial burden of pro-
duction to the states, by requiring an initial showing of inconsistency, 
will amply protect federal interests while preventing overzealous inter-
ference by the states. 
211. See supra section III.A. 
212. See supra section III.B. 
213. See supra section III.B. 
214. See supra section III.C. 
215. See supra Part IV. 
